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ABSTRACT 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND QUALITY OF  
GOVERNMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
by Sharon McKenna Camara 
May 2016 
Objectives. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations have made concerted attempts at 
economic integration and openness with use of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
beginning in the latter half of the 1990s. These changes could result in increases in trade 
and growth. The World Bank’s Good Governance indicators are designed to assess the 
quality of institutions in a given country.  The objective is to assess the impact of PTAs 
and Good Governance indicators on trade in SSA nations. Methods. Data on trade was 
generated based on exports defined by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Direction of Trade statistics, and both OLS and Tobit regression analysis was conducted 
to assess the impact of PTAs and Good Governance compared on growth. Results. The 
data demonstrates that PTAs have a negative impact on trade and that good governance 
does positively influence trade.  Conclusion.  This study shows that PTAs are a deterrent 
to trade, which bears further analysis of how to encourage growth in SSA countries, and 
demonstrates that governance is an important factors in SSA trade. Further infrastructure 
development as recommended by the International Trade Centre (2012) may provide new 
opportunities for growth.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper assesses international trade in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and whether 
trade is affected by regional trade agreements and quality of institutions. SSA countries 
have abundant natural resources and opportunities, yet development in these countries 
continues to stagnate, corruption is endemic in most countries, and industrialization and 
specialization have not taken off. In fact, the 2010 Governance Matters Control of 
Corruption Indicator shows that only two percent of SSA countries rank in the top 25 
percent of countries and 80 percent are in the lowest fifty percent (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2011). 
Theories examined in this paper include those based both on economic geography 
and the effect of institutions on development. Krugman (1991, 1), defines economic 
geography as “‘the location of production in space’ [;] that is, that branch of economics 
that worries about where things happen in relation to one another.” North (1994, 3) 
defines institutions as  
The humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made 
up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints 
(e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their 
enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of 
societies and specifically economies. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) and North (1990) identify that 
economic institutions, which align resources with their most efficient resources, are the 
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determining factor for whether a country is able to develop and grow, and they focus 
particularly on the importance of such institutions as property rights and open markets.  
Acemoglu says that economic institutions define both an economy’s potential for 
economic growth and the distribution of wealth resulting from economic growth. 
Dufrenot, Diop, and Sanon (2010) believe that failures of governance and institutions 
explain the stagnation of growth in per capita income in the ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African States) countries. 
Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008) state that economic geography addresses 
factors impacted by location, such as where producers are located in relation to 
consumers, and the benefits and costs of location-related choices.  Puga and Venables 
(1999) additionally propose that with agglomeration, all countries do not develop at the 
same pace. They suggest that poor countries transition to a developed state one at a time, 
at a rapid pace.  
African countries have an abundance of labor and availability of similar primary 
resources with similar relative factor costs in each country. With similar resources, there 
may not be reason for trade among these countries. In general, lack of variability, means 
that these countries should not have comparative advantage over each other. This limits 
trade potential both among African countries and between African countries and the rest 
of the world (Hanink and Owusu 1998). Yet the dilemma remains of how these countries 
will grow and develop without trade.  This paper focuses on these SSA trade agreements: 
South African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic 
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of 
Central Africa States (ECCAS).  
Musila (2005) analyzes trade creation and trade diversion in COMESA, ECCAS 
and ECOWAS. Musila observes that prior analyses do not fully address South-South 
trade and whether it is creating trade (countries start importing a product previously 
produced locally by inefficient producers) or diverting trade (with imports from lower-
cost non-member states to higher cost member states).  He cites that the Economic 
Commission for Africa argues that regional trade can actually promote market 
diversification and reverse deindustrialization and marginalization because it provides 
wider trading and investment environment that leads to economies of scale, induces 
backward and forward linkages and promotes diversification within regional markets to 
build experience before entering global markets. This contradicts the prediction of Yeats 
(1990) that these blocs will have a negative impact on industrialization and will divert 
imports from low to higher cost sources.  
Gbetnkom (2006) summarizes that ECOWAS continues to be effective in creating 
trade after the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) liberalization reforms were 
enacted.  His analysis contradicts Musila’s posit that trade diversion does not occur in 
ECOWAS, and he says that trade creation and trade diversion occur simultaneously. 
Recent studies indicate that trade liberalization efforts made in the 1980s may have 
resulted in increased intra-ECOWAS trade in the 1990s, and additional efforts to reduce 
trade barriers, specifically tariffs, in the 21st century, may have brought further 
improvements among ECOWAS countries (Arbache, Go, and Page 2008). 
 
 
4 
 
In an analysis of changes in the distribution of poverty throughout the world, 
Sala-i-Martin observes that world poverty rates declined significantly in the thirty years 
from 1970 to 2000, but that the improvements occurred primarily in Asian countries, 
while the situation in African countries worsened during that same time period. He says 
that poverty today is primarily an African problem, with 68 percent of the world’s poor 
living in Africa (Sala-i-Martin 2006). 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) state that when trade openness is low 
the combined impact of institutions and trade liberalization is negative on growth. As 
trade openness increases, quality institutions have a positive impact on growth. North 
(1991) explains the importance of institutions to trade, primarily because of their ability 
to reduce the uncertainty inherent in transactions. In order to have effective trade across 
international boundaries, there has to be an ability to establish agency with remote trading 
partners, contract enforcement and secure property rights. These factors are generally 
established by effective institutions. 
De Groot et al (2004) analyze international trade data with the incorporation of 
institutional quality indicators and determine that countries with similar institutional 
frameworks experience 13% more bilateral trade on average. They conclude institutional 
quality impacts bilateral trade flows. In addition, De Groot et al (2004) state that if 
institutions are not taken into account, then the gravity model experiences omitted 
variable bias.  In relation to this paper, De Groot et al do not specifically examine Africa 
nor do they examine impact of trade agreements. None of the prior works reviewed that 
examine trade in SSA countries incorporate institutional metrics as explanatory variables.  
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The World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, 5) has defined 
governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them.” The World Bank (2011) has developed six 
indicators of good governance:  
1. Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights 
2. Political Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats 
to, or changes in, government, including terrorism 
3. Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and 
the quality of public service delivery 
4. Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
5. Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6. Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private 
gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture 
These six indicators are developed with a reduction technique called unobserved-
components-model which is a variant of factor analysis that extracts components 
common to the 300 different measures in the original data (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2011). The concept is that a good government is one that complies with Adam 
Smith’s guidance that institutions result in greater prosperity (Smith 1776). 
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This analysis is conducted using the gravity model. The gravity model examines 
reasons for trade among countries.  The gravity model is a bilateral trade flow model 
where relationships are examined from each country to each of the other countries being 
examined, so that for n countries in the model, there are (n*(n-1)) relationships. It is 
inspired by Newton’s gravity equation in which two bodies are attracted in proportion to 
their masses and distance. The gravity model analyzes trade between a pair of countries 
as an increasing function of incomes (size) and a decreasing function of their distance 
(Aitken 1973). 
Credit is given to both Tinbergen and Pöyhönen in the early 1960s for 
concurrently and independently developing this model of international trade (Sandberg 
2006). Tinbergen (1962) identifies the gravity model to examine the flow of trade 
between two countries utilizing three primary indicators: the gross national product 
(GNP) of the exporting country, the GNP of the importing country, and distance. 
Tinbergen further explains the justification for these three indicators, the export GNP 
indicates the size of a country’s market (or the amount that can be sold), the import GNP 
indicates the amount a country can buy (or the country’s market) and distance is a proxy 
for transportation costs.  
The dependent variable for gravity model analysis is the amount of trade between 
two countries. The gravity model assesses whether total exports, or trade, between two 
countries is a function of the selected independent variables.  Export data is collected 
from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics dataset (2014). The 
gravity model for this paper states that the trade between two countries is a function of 
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the GDP of both the exporting and importing countries, the distance between the major 
cities of the two countries, dummy variables for whether or not the countries share a 
common border, whether or not the countries have a common official or ethnic language, 
whether or not the exporting or both countries are ECOWAS, EAC, COMESA, SADC or 
ECCAS members, and what is the quality of institutions of the exporting and importing 
country, using an average of the six individual indicators.   
Hypotheses 
H1: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade for member countries: 
Countries that are members of SADC, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS or ECOWAS 
experience higher trade than countries that are not members of one of those five 
trade blocs. 
H2: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade between members of the trade 
bloc: Trade between countries within the trading blocs (member-to-member) is 
greater than trade with countries outside of the trading bloc. 
H3: Institutional quality affects trade in SSA countries: countries with higher quality 
of governmental institutions experience more trade  
Countries that trade are countries that grow (Dollar and Kraay 2003). The fact that 
some countries trade more than others drives differentiation and results in some countries 
being richer than others. SSA countries not only experience more less growth and more 
poverty, but they have lower quality of institutions. 
This paper utilizes regression analysis to assess the impacts of regional trading 
blocs and institutional quality on trade. The model will utilize OLS regression in 2010 
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with comparison to 1980, 1990, and 2000, and will compare to Tobit regression 
conducted in the same years.  Countries included in the trade bloc and institutional 
quality analysis are SSA countries in the five identified trade blocs, additional SSA 
countries not in the trade blocs, and additional countries included in similar studies for 
which export trade data is available for the selected years. The government quality data is 
only available after 1995. 
This paper continues with a review of literature in Chapter II, a discussion of 
methods in Chapter III, a presentation of results and analysis in Chapter IV, and a 
conclusion in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This dissertation examines the occurrence of trade over geographic space, and 
how it is impacted by institutional quality and regional trade agreements. The paper looks 
at economic geography and institutional quality and the impacts of regional trade 
agreements.  
All economic activities take place in a location, or across locations. This is easily 
observable and can be viewed at the micro level of an individual business choosing a 
location for a factory and at the macro level with trade occurring across industries and 
nations. Underlying this simple observation are theories that seek to explain such details 
as why a business decides to open a factory in a given location, why concentrations of 
factories and industries occur, or why trade in goods occurs across space – whether that 
be in towns, cities, regions or nations. Spatial economics, or economic geography, 
attempts to address questions such as these. 
Krugman (1991, 1) defines economic geography as “the location of production in 
space; that is, that branch of economics that worries about where things happen in 
relation to one another.” According to Krugman, economics is intrinsically geographic, 
but examination and utilization of the geographic aspect has been either consciously 
removed from theory or sometimes just forgotten since the 1960s.  Combes, Mayer, and 
Thisse (2008) state that economic geography addresses factors impacted by location, such 
as where producers are located in relation to consumers, and the benefits and costs of 
location-related choices.  
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Economies of scale, where it costs less to produce a lot of things at one location 
than to produce fewer things at many locations, is part of a more comprehensive set of 
events known as agglomeration. Agglomeration is the clustering of economic activity, 
created and sustained by a sort of circular logic. Agglomeration can occur in a small local 
market or across large areas that serve a world market. The circular concept is self-
reinforcing. Firms want to locate where market potential is high, and markets will tend to 
be large where lots of firms locate (Krugman 1995). The circular phenomenon of 
agglomeration is also known as the snowball effect, which results in its continuous 
reinforcement once it is set in motion (Combes, Mayer, and Thisse 2008). 
Occurrences of agglomeration have two key points in their development. The 
break point is when a uniform spatial economy spontaneously begins to develop 
concentrations of population and/or industry, and it truly becomes an agglomeration 
when it reaches the sustain point where the established agglomerations are able to survive 
even under conditions that would not have caused them to form in the first place (Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables 1999). 
The question remains of how the agglomeration actually forms and then increases 
in size through this snowball effect. There are two aspects to this, one related to the 
workers and the other related to the industries.  The initial development of industry in a 
location draws workers. The increase in the number of workers is also an increase in the 
number of consumers. This in turn pushes up the local demand for the manufactured 
good, triggering the installation of more firms in the region. This is termed backward 
linkages.  
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The infusion of more firms pushes nominal wages upward. With the number of 
firms located in the region increasing, the variety of products produced also increases. 
The result of this is that the equilibrium price index of manufactured goods decreases in 
this region. Together the increase in workers and nominal wages and the decrease in price 
index results in an increase in real wages which then induces a new flow of workers who, 
all else being equal, benefit from a higher standard of living. This is termed forward 
linkages. If the effects of forward and backward linkages are combined, migration toward 
the large market should continue until the whole industry is concentrated there (Combes, 
Mayer, and Thisse 2008).  As a result of these impacts, locations with a higher demand 
for manufactures may pay higher nominal wages (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). 
Jones and Kierzkowski (2004) point out that increases in the outsourcing of 
economic activity, whether nationally or globally may lead to new forms of 
agglomeration. Industries may have fragments that are similar from one industry to 
another even though the integrated whole is not the same. This fragmentation can lead to 
a horizontal spread wherein the similarity between fragments across industries promotes 
technological progress to make fragments even more similar and thus encourages new 
forms of agglomeration An example of this might be the outsourcing of call centers to 
India across a number of industries, which has resulted in a specialization of the call 
center service industry, whether supporting technology industry or retail industry.  
There are a number of impacts of distance related to economic geography, and 
these impacts are assessed with a model that identifies those impacts in relation to 
international trade, the gravity model. Trade costs are frequently approximated with data 
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on the distance between trading partners. This information is intended to combine 
transport costs, transport time (addressing perishability, adaptability to market conditions, 
and irregularities in supply), and psychic distance (addressing familiarity with laws, 
institutions, and habits) (Junius 1999).  
In order to understand barriers to trade and their impacts, the gravity model 
analyzes costs of doing business over geographical space. The theory includes the costs 
of doing business at a distance (including lack of face-to-face contact, more complex and 
expensive communications and information gathering, and different languages, legal 
systems, product standards and cultures).  If amount of trade between two countries 
decreases with distance further apart they are, this could be due to increased costs of 
trade. The way to evaluate that is with the gravity model (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 
1999). 
The gravity model has both robust empirical results and simplicity of functional 
form. Helpman (1987) derives a structural form of a gravity equation out of an 
international trade model with imperfect competition. He shows that the larger the 
similarity in factor compositions, the larger the share of intra-industry trade, and changes 
over time in relative country size can explain rising trade-to-income ratios.  Bergstrand 
(1989) combines Heckscher-Ohlin elements, Chamberlinian monopolistic competition 
and the Linder hypothesis in his model (Junius 1999). 
Given that distance does not change over time, seeing a declining regression 
coefficient of geographic distance over time would indicate a decline in the marginal 
effect of distance between trading partners (Junius 1999).  According to Pomfret (1997), 
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distance is a strong factor in the size of bilateral trade flows, but he also says that distance 
is largely ignored in trade theory. Pomfret (1997) also provides a succinct summary that 
the gravity model depends upon the size of two economies, measured by total output and 
the distance between them.  
Though the costs of transportation have declined dramatically over the past 200 
years, the costs of trade continue to be important explanatory variables for trade between 
countries.  Effects of contiguity and common language are large and are estimated to 
multiply trade by 2 and 2.6 respectively. Contiguity and common-language effects have 
increased over time, so that sharing a common language or border has an impact on trade 
that is higher now than it was thirty, forty, or fifty years ago (Combes, Mayer, and Thisse 
2008). 
When assessing impacts to trade, these are the types of trade barriers are generally 
considered: 
1. Natural barriers related to physical geography – distance, mountains, coastal – are 
grouped together in what we will call transport costs 
2. Trade policy measures, or those with an environmental focus, as well as exchange 
rate transaction costs for countries that do not share the same currency. 
3. Information costs 
4. Cultural differences 
These four factors are all considered to impact trade costs and trade preference. 
All, in fact, restrict trade, but they also simplify the actuality of trade barriers by not 
accounting for more complex differences such as those from protectionist policies, 
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transportation infrastructure and insufficient explanation for border effects (Combes, 
Mayer, and Thisse 2008). There is an alternative method of assessing trade costs without 
using the gravity model which is based on the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model. This model 
defines the overall degree of market segmentation indirectly through price differentials 
and the gap between actual trade flows (Combes, Mayer, and Thisse 2008).  
Regions are an important part of economic geography because as nations have 
evolved tariffs, taxes and other protectionist strategies, formal regional agreements have 
been implemented to attempt to eliminate national borders as a barrier to trade. There are 
a couple of different uses of the term region. A region could be a trading bloc of 
countries who have set up a formal agreement that includes reducing or eliminating trade 
barriers between them that are within their control. In this instance of the term, labor is 
usually considered immobile due to the challenges of immigration. The term region may 
also be used to refer to an area where a particular product is produced – so there could be 
certain types of manufacturing or agricultural regions that have many characteristics in 
common, but do not have an agreement in place and are not necessarily trying to work 
together across the common industry. Frequently this type of region resides within a 
single country, in which case labor resources would be considered mobile. 
During the 1800s, the economic development of Europe decreased at the same 
time that distance-related costs were declining. In this situation, though costs to engage in 
trade were lower, increased trade did not occur in the European economic region, 
demonstrating that regional economics are uneven. (Combes, Mayer, and Thisse 2008).  
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When transport costs are high, interregional trade will generally be low. Wages 
will depend primarily on local competition. When transport costs are low, a typical firm 
sells extensively in both regions.  Proximity to regions with larger population improves 
access to markets. In that situation, it can then afford to pay higher wages. Consequently, 
the purchasing power of the wages is also higher because workers have better access to 
consumer goods. Real wages would be increasing in the region’s population. (Combes, 
Mayer, and Thisse 2008). 
There are two types of regional economic activities: those that are the region’s 
economic base, also called the export base, because it is the region’s response to demands 
from outside of the region, and the second type are those activities that supply goods and 
services locally. There are some instances where the goods provided locally and 
regionally are one and the same, which serves only to increase the economies of scale, 
but sometimes a firm may have completely different or sometimes slightly different 
products that they offer at home and outside of their region. When the regional economy 
is strong, a firm may offer many more goods and services in their local market because 
the market can afford it and helps with developing new products that can be sold outside 
of the region (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). 
As a result of the advantages to having a firm set up in the larger region with a 
strong local market, firms that are established in the larger regions, generally see higher 
profits than those in the smaller region. Again, this dynamic could also be self-fulfilling; 
the core region would therefore attract more firms, increasing inequalities between the 
core and the periphery. At the same time, when firms choose to set up in the core region, 
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they are choosing to compete and should expect to find competition waiting for them 
(Combes, Mayer, and Thisse 2008). Remarkably, spatial structure can evolves by itself 
(Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999)  
Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008) also point out that economic geography is 
differentiated from international trade by the fact that in international trade, all factors are 
considered immobile, but in the study of economic geography, some factors are mobile 
(non-labor). As a result, regional differences can arise due to firm location based on 
market size and market access. The Dixit-Stiglitz model indicates that market-size effects 
are a result of changes in variety (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). 
Krugman’s model of immobility versus mobility helps to develop understanding 
of regional unevenness of development. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999)  pose a 
mechanism by which regional markets develop at the international level. Beginning with 
one region or country that has established a self-reinforcing market in a manufacturing 
sector, this region is now able to offer higher wages than other parts of the world. The 
demand for this particular product rises and the region that has the expertise in this 
commodity benefits from agglomeration and from the ability to increase wages. As the 
wage gap increases, firms are able to establish and be competitive in a second region. 
That region then begins to develop its own self-reinforcing market, and is able to increase 
wages as well. This can continue to happen in additional regions.  
Puga and Venables (1999) propose that with agglomeration, all countries do not 
develop at the same pace. They suggest that poor countries transition to a developed state 
one at a time, at a rapid pace. It is posed by Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999)  that 
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such uneven development may have been a predictable result over time of the increase in 
world integration. They also suggest that some recent narrowing of income gaps (China, 
for example), might also be related to the same phenomena – once a country is able to 
participate effectively in world trade, the dynamic changes dramatically because as trade 
costs decrease, global inequalities also decrease (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). 
Thus economic geography also becomes a mechanism to begin to understand the impacts 
of economic integration on spatial inequality.  According to Combes, Mayer, and Thisse 
(2008), trade costs actually can serve as a proxy for economic integration, and a reduction 
in these costs means that there is a greater degree of integration. 
SSA countries have some of the greatest natural resources and opportunities in the 
world, yet development continues to stagnate, corruption is endemic in most countries, 
and industrialization and specialization have not taken off. Between 1995 and 2005, there 
have been changes in Africa. According to Arbache, Go, and Page (2008), SSA leaders 
are taking increasing control of their economic destiny. After 45 years of stagnation, 
improvements are being made but the authors do not believe these changes are resulting 
in significant improvements in economic development.  This dissertation examines 
whether these changes may be starting to drive increased trade over time by specifically 
examining the impacts of regional trading blocs and institutional quality. 
This paper focuses on countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the ECOWAS 
regional trading block within West Africa. According to the Centre for Democracy and 
Development (2002), a regional trade agreement, or regionalism, is earmarked by a group 
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of countries with geographic proximity, and a common purpose seeking to improve an 
economic or political objective of the countries within the agreement.   
Recent studies indicate that trade liberalization efforts made in the 1980s may 
have resulted in increased intra-ECOWAS trade in the 1990s, and additional efforts to 
reduce trade barriers, specifically tariffs, in the 21st century, may have brought further 
improvements among ECOWAS countries (Arbache, Go, and Page 2008). 
African countries now numerous, sometimes overlapping regional trade 
agreements that likely dilute the impact of any one trade agreement. In fact, only seven of 
the 53 African countries are members of just one regional agreement. Twenty-seven 
countries are members of two regional integration agreements, and 18 are members of 
three.  One country, the Democratic Republic of Congo, is a member of four different 
organizations (Nyirabu 2004). 
The development of regional trade agreements in Africa has been considered a 
preliminary step to unification of Africa. Unifying Africa into something of the sort of 
the United States of Africa has been a topic of discussion since it was introduced by 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and others immediately after colonial independence 
(Nkrumah 1970). While Nkrumah sought immediate unity, Tanzanian leader Julius 
Nyerere proposed that unity must be phased in over time via regional alignments, and 
that is the approach that was taken. In 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action encouraged 
African countries to create regional agreements as a step towards the ultimate creation of 
an African Economic Community.  The Lagos Plan identifies three steps to achieving an 
integrated African economy: 1) trade liberalization, 2) customs unions, and 3) a single 
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economic community. In 1990, the Abuja treaty was signed as a commitment to 
achieving the African Economic Community by 2025 (Nyirabu 2004). 
In 2008, three trade blocs, COMESA, SADC and EAC joined together to form the 
African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ). The AFTZ includes 26 countries that span the length 
of Africa, but has not been in place for sufficient time to identify changes as a result of 
the agreement, and there is almost no available documentation beyond the original 
announcement on October 22, 2008 (BBC 2008).  
While there has always been interest in a unified Africa, there are many reasons 
why this has not happened yet which seem to align with potential reasons that SSA 
countries are not developing. These reasons include, “lack of grassroots support, 
excessive external dependency, institutional weakness, multiplicity of organisations (sic), 
politics, underdeveloped economies, the international economic structure and distribution 
of the benefits of integration” (Nyirabu 2004, 23).These justifications for lack of unity 
are also cited as the argument for why economic integration is needed in Africa. 
This dissertation focuses on the following trade agreements, SADC, EAC, 
COMESA, ECCAS and ECOWAS. The SADC was formed in August 1992 with 14 
countries (see Table 2.1) and a goal to introduce free trade in 2008 and liberalize country-
specific products by 2012.  According to Nyirabu (2004), the SADC has established four 
centralized directorates, negotiated 21 protocols, implemented 10 of them, and has 
experienced a small increase in trade among the member states. Within the SADC, five 
countries, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa, have successfully 
established a customs union with no internal tariffs. 
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Table 2.1  
Members of Selected Sub-Saharan African Regional Trade Agreements 
 
COMESA* 
 
EAC* 
 
ECCAS 
 
ECOWAS 
 
SADC* 
 
Burundi 
Comoros 
D.R. Congo 
Djibouti 
Egypt ** 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Libya ** 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Burundi 
Kenya 
Rwanda 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
 
Angola  
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
D.R. Congo 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Gabon 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome et 
Principe 
 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Cote d’Ivoire 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
 
Angola 
Botswana 
D.R. Congo 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania  
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
* Members of Africa Free Trade Zone (established 2008) 
** Not SSA countries 
COMESA was established in 1993 with 20 member countries and goals to 
establish a customs union, a common external tariff (CET) and to align policies of 
member countries by 2004. As of Nyiarabu’s (2004) assessment, only nine of the 
countries had ratified the free trade protocol, but they have seen a 30 percent increase in 
intra-COMESA trade after the initiation of free trade in October 2000. 
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The EAC began in 2000 with the objective of implementing a customs union by 
2003 to be followed by a common market, monetary union and then a political federation. 
As of 2004, they were still finalizing their customs protocol (Nyirabu 2004). 
ECCAS was signed as a treaty in October 1983 and was inactive from 1992 until 
recently, primarily due to lack of member fee payment and the conflict in the D.R. 
Congo. ECOWAS was created on May 28, 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria.  There are 16 member 
states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  The 
primary objective of ECOWAS according to its treaty is: “…accelerated and sustained 
economic development of [the member] states and the creation of a homogeneous 
society, leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of all 
types of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, and persons” (Hanink and 
Owusu 1998, 365). ECOWAS did not implement its comprehensive trade liberalization 
approach until 1990, and these changes did not result in the elimination on internal tariffs 
completely or the creation of a common external tariff (CET).  
Most of the ECOWAS countries participated in Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP) in the late 1980s. The SAP reforms contributed to a reductions in 
tariff and in non-tariff trade barriers.  These reforms included lower tariffs, reduction of 
prohibitive tariffs, and application of low tariffs on certain import goods (Gbetnkom 
2006). These reforms resulted in the following policy changes:  
 more flexible exchange rate,  
 reduced export taxes,  
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 lower import controls,  
 less variability import tariffs,  
 privatization of state-run entities, and  
 removal of price control and restrictions on private business (though 
Ghana eliminated restrictions and licenses on exports and imports in 
January 1989).   
Musila (2005) analyzes trade creation and trade diversion in COMESA, ECCAS 
and ECOWAS. Musila observes that prior analyses do not fully address South-South 
trade and whether it is creating trade (countries start importing a product previously 
produced locally by inefficient producers) or diverting trade (with imports moving from 
lower-cost non-member states to higher cost member states).  He cites that the Economic 
Commission for Africa argues that regional trade can promote market diversification and 
reverse deindustrialization and marginalization because it provides wider trading and 
investment environment that leads to economies of scale, induces backward and forward 
linkages and promotes diversification within regional markets to build experience before 
entering global markets. This contradicts the prediction of Yeats (1990) that these blocs 
will have a negative impact on industrialization and will divert imports from low to 
higher cost sources.   
Gbetnkom (2006)summarizes that ECOWAS continues to be effective in creating 
trade after the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) liberalization reforms were 
enacted.  His analysis contradicts Musila’s posit that trade diversion does not occur in 
ECOWAS, and he says that trade creation and trade diversion occur simultaneously. 
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Table 2.2 
Comparison of Gravity Model Studies 
 
Author 
 
 
Scope of 
Trade 
 
Model 
 
Analysis 
 
Categories/ Variables 
 
Countries 
Foroutan and 
Pritchet (1993) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1980-82 
Gravity 
Model 
Tobit 
Regression 
(replace 0s 
with small 
positive 
values) 
African  
African Oil Export 
Distance 
Adjacent Border 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
Area 
Island 
ASEAN 
LAFTA 
CACM 
Lime 
CEAO 
ECOWAS  
UDEAC 
Language 
 
Hanink and 
Owusu (1998) 
ECOWAS 
countries 
1973 and 1993 
Gravity 
Model 
Trade 
Intensity 
Index and 
Tobit 
Regression 
GNP exporter 
GNP importer 
Distance 
Adjacent Border 
Language 
CFA (pegged 
currency) 
Arab 
CEAO 
ECOWAS 
ECOWAS 
Algeria 
Cameroon 
Central 
African Rep 
Chad 
Congo 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Gabon 
Libya 
Morocco 
 
Musila (2005) COMESA, 
ECCAS and 
ECOWAS 
Countries 
1991-1998  
Gravity 
Model 
WLS GNP exporter  
GNP Importer 
Population 
Distance 
Adjacent Border 
Language 
CFA 
COMESA/ ECCAS/ 
ECOWAS – Intra-
trade, Extra-imports, 
Extra-exports 
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Table 2.2 (continued). 
 
Author 
 
 
Scope of 
Trade 
 
Model 
 
Analysis 
 
Categories/ Variables 
 
Countries 
Gbetnkom(2006) Uses 28 
reporting 
countries, 21 
in SSA and 33 
partner states 
1994-2003 
(uses avg 94-
98 and 99-03) 
Gravity 
Model 
 GDP exporter 
GDP importer 
Distance 
Population 
Difference in per 
capita income 
CEMAC 
COMESA 
ECOWAS 
ECOWAS importer 
Language 
 
Subramanian and 
Tamirisa (2003) 
Non-EU 
world 73 
country 
sample 
1980, 1990, 
2000 
Gravity 
Model 
Non-Linear 
estimation 
GDP 
Population 
Distance 
Remoteness 
Anglophone 
Francophone 
Intra-Anglophone 
trade 
Intra-Francophone 
trade 
Non-EU Adv.- 
Anglophone Trade 
Non-EU Adv.- 
Francophone Trade 
Developing Country 
– Anglophone Trade 
Developing Country- 
Francophone Trade 
CFA 
Free Trade Agmt 
Primary Commodity 
Exporter 
Time Trend 
 
 
Studies have shown that ECOWAS may be effective only because of 
longstanding relationships between the countries, with or without the ECOWAS 
agreement. Recent studies indicate that trade liberalization efforts made in the 1980s may 
have resulted in increased intra-ECOWAS trade in the 1990s, and additional efforts to 
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reduce trade barriers, specifically tariffs, in the 21st century, may have brought further 
improvements among ECOWAS countries (Arbache, Go and Page 2008). 
Research on trade impacts of regional trading blocs in SSA countries includes 
Hanink and Owusu (1998) who took data snapshots from 1980 and 1990. They find small 
significant increase in trade from the start of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) regional trade agreement through 1990.  
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) propose an economic model to explain why trade 
agreements are needed.  Their model is based on the premise that governments, in setting 
tariffs, seek to escape from a Prisoner’s Dilemma.  They state that, in setting tariffs, 
governments respond to a terms-of-trade externality which means that they set import 
tariffs to maximize welfare, though some tariff costs fall to exporters whose products sell 
at a lower price.   
The Prisoner’s Dilemma faced by governments, is that in the absence of 
assurance regarding the actions of other nations, the government must look out for their 
own welfare and defect or take a defensive stance, thus putting in place higher tariffs than 
might be efficient or optimal.   
The Prisoner’s dilemma is usually drawn in a two by two matrix, describing that 
the least optimal quadrants are when one country cooperates and the other does not. The 
Nash equilibrium equates to the lower right hand quadrant where neither country 
cooperates.  The optimal solution, is when both countries cooperate. (Spencer and 
Brander, 2008), and agree jointly to give up something, such as tariffs, under a managed 
agreement so that all involved countries will benefit.   
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Table 2.3 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix Hughes (2007) 
 Country B – Cooperates Country B – Defects 
Country A – Cooperates Optimal Scenario Good for A/Bad for B 
Country A - Defects Good for B/ Bad for A Suboptimal outcome for 
both = Nash Equilibrium 
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) pose that achieving the optimal solution, or escaping 
from a terms-of-trade-driven prisoner’s dilemma, happens through a trade agreement. 
Their trade model describes this effect in comparison to the Nash outcome, where no one 
benefits. The trade model is based on the general equilibrium model, using two countries 
that trade two goods.   They first model the inefficient dynamic of the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium.  In this model, Bagwell and Staiger define the contract curve, which 
are the tariffs that are efficient and yield greater-than-Nash welfare for each country. 
Thus, the goal of a trade agreement would be to negotiate tariffs that would fall on the 
contract curve, or efficiency frontier.  This curve may include the reciprocal-free-trade 
point (where both countries eliminate all tariffs and engage in free trade), but includes 
many other pairs as well. 
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Non-cooperative Nash 
Equilibrium
N
E
E
Contract Curve
(Bold Portion)
1
1 Ŧ*
Ŧ
R
Reciprocal-Free-Trade 
Point
 
Figure 2.1. Non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium (Ŧ = domestic tariff +1 and Ŧ* = foreign 
tariff + 1) 
 According to Bagwell and Staiger (2002), governments seek to address their 
interests in both economic-efficiency (national welfare) consequences of local-price 
movements as well the distributional or political consequences when negotiating a trade 
agreement. Overall, the goal of a trade agreement is to move from a situation approaching 
the Nash Equilibrium, where trade policy is set unilaterally and costs are shifted from one 
country to another via change in world price caused by the tariffs, to one that approaches 
the efficiency frontier through reciprocal trade liberalization.  Reciprocal means that both 
governments must agree to reduce their tariffs below the Nash equilibrium in order to 
have a successful outcome, which is frequently the intent of a PTA. If not reciprocal, the 
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result is that the pair ends up one of the two quadrants of the matrix in which the net 
outcome is worse than the Nash outcome for one of the countries.   
E
E
Contract Curve
(Bold Portion)
1
Ŧ
R
Reciprocal-Free-Trade 
Point = Agreement 
Point
 
Figure 2.2.  SSA Countries with no tariffs (Ŧ = domestic tariff +1 and Ŧ* = foreign tariff 
+ 1) 
The benefit of the perspective shown in Figure 2.2 is that it frees up the efficiency 
locus, by stating that the most efficient tariff point may not be the point of reciprocal free 
trade, which provides many more outcomes that are possible.  In addition, by 
demonstrating this, Bagwell and Staiger have shown that while a government may have 
both nation.al welfare and political motivations, political considerations are not the only 
driver for a trade agreement and can be incorporated with an economic motivator in a 
single economic trade model. 
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NE
E
1
1 Ŧ*
Ŧ
R
Reciprocal-Free-
Trade 
Point
Politically Optimum (PO) 
Efficiency Locus
W
W*
P
w
PO
Politically Optimum 
World Price
Range of possible 
locations for scenario 2 – 
both SSA countries still 
retain tariffs
 
Figure 2.3.  Trade negotiations – both countries have tariffs (Ŧ = domestic tariff +1 and 
Ŧ* = foreign tariff + 1) 
Figure 2.3 helps to describe the impact of a trade agreement.  Here again, the 
Nash Equilibrium (N) equates to a non-cooperative state.  The use of a trade agreement 
can help governments to move their tariffs closer to the contract curve (E).  This graphic 
model demonstrates that the efficiency locus on the contract curve does not necessarily 
pass through the point of free trade, which would occur when the tariffs are reciprocal.  
W represents the welfare of the domestic government, and W* the foreign government.   
 Bagwell and Staiger (2002) additionally take the perspective that in moving from 
the Nash Equilibrium to the contract curve, the governments are securing additional 
market access from their trading partner. By reducing import tariffs, a government is 
increasing its partner’s access to that country’s markets, because there is a simultaneous 
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lowering of local prices. If a government does not obtain additional market access from 
its partner, then the result would be a terms-of-trade loss for the domestic country.  
 In applying Bagwell and Staiger’s model to SSA PTAs, there are several points to 
consider. The first point is that since this model only applies to trade that passes through 
official channels, there may be impact from unrecorded trade.  The second point is, given 
the relationships among the SSA countries and their colonial backgrounds, it could be 
possible that the countries might not start from the Nash Equilibrium point when a trade 
agreement is created. If the SSA countries start from another point, it is possible that it 
could be a point closer to their politically optimal point.  A final point is that if the SSA 
PTAs have not had any impact on trade and do not result in reaching a more optimal 
tariff point, then what is the impetus for the agreement? 
Non-cooperative Nash 
Equilibrium
N
E
E
Contract Curve
(Bold Portion)
1
1 Ŧ*
Ŧ
R
Reciprocal-Free-Trade 
Point
Potential starting point for 
agreements with 
unrecorded trade between 
countries
 
Figure 2.4. Trade negotiations with Unrecorded Trade (Ŧ = domestic tariff +1 and Ŧ* = 
foreign tariff + 1) 
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 Regarding the first point, Bagwell and Staiger’s model shows that the politically 
optimal point would be the point of reciprocal free trade. Unrecorded Transborder Trade 
(UTT) could be as much as or more than the recorded trade.  To take a more conservative 
perspective, according to Edoho (1997), UTT accounts for approximately 20 to 35 
percent of the trade among ECOWAS countries, and it is likely that there is similar UTT 
in other regions of SSA.  This means that 20 to 35 percent of trade is technically 
reciprocal free trade, because there are no tariffs or taxes paid on this unrecorded trade.  
Therefore, only 65 to 80 percent of trade must be addressed by a regional trade agreement 
to reach a politically optimal point. 
This model only addresses two countries, so clearly the picture will be different 
for different countries.  There are three scenarios at this point: the first is where both 
countries have eliminated all tariffs between them, in which case they have reached a 
reciprocal free trade state as shown in Figure 2.2.  This is the optimal scenario described 
in the top left box of the prisoner’s dilemma matrix.  
The second scenario is when both countries still have tariffs between them. If 
those tariffs have changed over time, then it would be important to assess where those fall 
in relation to the contract curve. This scenario might look similar to Figure 2.3 above.  
Assuming the countries seem have started with some free (undocumented) trade in place, 
they begin in a better position than the Nash equilibrium. At the same time, they have not 
negotiated together and their existing tariffs have been arbitrarily applied, so it is unlikely 
that they have achieved a politically optimum point described in Figure 2.2, therefore 
 
 
32 
 
they are probably floating somewhere between the suboptimal Nash point and a point on 
the contract curve. 
In the third scenario, one country has eliminated tariffs and the other has not.  
This is the worst of the scenarios, and is depicted by either of the two boxes in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix where one country defects and the other country cooperates. 
Looking at figure 2.4, it is all good for the foreign country, and all bad for the domestic 
country. The higher the tariff is, the worse off they are. 
NE
E
1
Ŧ
R
W
W*
P
w
PO
Scenario where one SSA 
country has eliminated 
tariffs and the other has 
not.
 
Figure 2.5. SSA trade negotiations – one country has tariffs, the other does not 
(Ŧ = domestic tariff +1 and Ŧ* = foreign tariff + 1) 
 Since these countries have such significant undocumented trade, it is clear that 
they did not start from the Nash equilibrium, but must have started at a point that would 
be 20 to 35 percent closer to the politically optimal point of reciprocal free trade. 
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Non-cooperative Nash 
Equilibrium
N
E
E
Contract Curve
(Bold Portion)
1
1 Ŧ*
Ŧ
R
Reciprocal-Free-Trade 
Point
R
Potential Starting Point for 
SSA trade negotiations
 
Figure 2.6. Trade negotiations with Unrecorded Trade (Ŧ = domestic tariff +1 and Ŧ* = 
foreign tariff + 1) 
 The third point addresses the fact that if the SSA countries were not trying to 
escape the Prisoner’s Dilemma of the Nash equilibrium, why were they interested in a 
trade agreement and how has the agreement benefited them? Looking at the background 
of the SSA trade agreements, the SSA countries were likely pursuing political as much 
as, if not more than, economic objectives with their alliances.. For example, ECOWAS 
has been extensively involved in resolving conflicts in West Africa. While this is 
considered to be part of their original mission, it is also true that the extent of this effort 
required in this area caught the organization by surprised, and ECOWAS has only 
recently become more effective at resolving conflict (Chambas 2007). There is an 
unstated objective of the ECOWAS agreement to “overcome the established legacies of 
colonial inheritance of the West African region’s political Balkanisation and its inferior 
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locus in the world economic system” (Hanink and Owusu, 1998, 365).  Essentially, a 
purpose of the agreement is to reinstate the ability for interaction based on pre-colonial 
ethnic boundaries, which still exist.  Thus, ECOWAS allows free movement of persons 
across these arbitrary political borders that have impeded interpersonal relationships that 
include trade, which should provide the ability for labor to be available where needed.   
 Examining the impacts of the Bagwell and Staiger model as applied to SSA 
agreements identified three primary areas of focus.   
1. Impact of unrecorded trade   
2. Given the relationships among the ECOWAS countries and their colonial 
background, did they really start from the Nash Equilibrium when the trade agreement 
was created, or did they start from another point, and if they started from another point, 
might it have been a point closer to their politically optimal point?   
3. If the SSA trade agreements have not had any impact on trade and did not 
result in reaching a more optimal tariff point, then what was the impetus for the 
agreement? 
Unrecorded trade could be as low as 20 to 35 percent, which means that the 
ECOWAS agreement would only need to address 65 to 80 percent of trade.  As a result, 
the SSA countries could not have started at the NASH equilibrium, and after more than 
30 years under various agreements, their current positions vary across the continent 
depending on the three possible scenarios described above. Given any two SSA countries 
today, they either have no tariffs between them, they both have tariffs, or one country has 
tariffs and one does not.  
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Ideally, a regional trade agreement should place all countries in an equal 
relationship with each other.  Clearly, SSA PTAs have not yet created an equal 
environment for all participating countries. While they have objectives to achieve 
consistent external tariffs and customs unions, that there continue to be barriers to 
achieving these goals.  Bagwell and Staiger have proposed that the true reason for a trade 
agreement is to escape the Prisoner’s dilemma.  The SSA trade agreements have placed 
several of its countries exactly in that dilemma.  
De Groot et al (2004) analyze international trade data with the incorporation of 
institutional quality indicators and determine that the institutional indicator is an 
important component of a trade model and should be included in future studies, but do 
not specifically examine Africa or the related trade agreements. None of the prior works 
that examine trade in SSA countries incorporates an institutional variable as an 
explanatory variable. 
Economic institutions, property rights, and open economies, are determining 
factors of growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004) (D. North 1990). Acemoglu 
Johnson, and Robinson point out that economic institutions not only help to make the 
overall pie bigger, but also determine how that pie is distributed (2004).  They define 
good economic institutions as those with property rights and access to economic 
resources across society.   
Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) state that institutions have a robust and 
positive impact on growth, and they also enhance the effectiveness of trade liberalization. 
Dollar and Kraay (2003) have a similar finding that good institutions are critical for a 
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country to experience long term growth gains from trade liberalization. North (1994, 3) 
defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. 
They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal 
constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and 
their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies 
and specifically economies.” 
A state with effective institutions should be able to implement good governance 
practices, and with those in place, their country should experience growth (Baliamoune-
Lutz and Ndikumana 2007).  The question at hand is whether trade is impacted by good 
governance.  In sub-Saharan Africa, many countries have not developed, and, in fact are 
worse off than they were at the time of independence from colonization. This paper 
examines whether the effects of good governance and regional trade have impacted trade 
in African states, with specific focus on the countries that are members of the major 
regional trading blocs. 
A nation with effective institutions and an open economy should experience 
economic growth and development (Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana 2007). In Africa, 
effective institutions are lacking, self-serving dictators are prevalent, even in countries 
that claim to be democracies, and many protective trade barriers are in place. Between 
1980 and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world experienced increasing 
overall growth. African countries, which have also had various protectionist policies in 
place, started to implement significant changes in their economic structures in the latter 
half of this time period (Arbache, Go, and Page 2008).  
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Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) and North (1990) identify that 
economic institutions are the determining factor for whether a country is able to develop 
and grow, and they focus particularly on the importance of such institutions as property 
rights and open markets.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson additionally point out that 
economic institutions can both support development and support the policy for how 
development is managed or implemented.  They define good economic institutions as 
“those that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic 
resources to a broad cross-section of society” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004, 
9).  Diop, Dufrenot, and Sanon (2010) believe poor governance and institutions’ failures 
explain the lack of growth in ECOWAS. 
Overall, SSA countries face the challenge of an abundance of labor, shortage of 
capital and availability of the same raw goods with similar relative factor costs in each 
country, which reduces opportunity for trade among these countries. In general, lack of 
variability or specialization, means that no countries have a comparative advantage 
(Hanink and Owusu 1998). 
Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) discuss the issue of unrecorded trans-border trade 
(UTT), noting that research from the 1990s has shown that UTT might be equal to or 
higher than recorded trade. They also discussed another study that mentioned that the 
discrepancy was more than 60 percent.  This data contrasts somewhat with the findings of 
Edoho (1997)  who defined UTT in West Africa as ranging from 20 to 35 percent.  
Whatever the number, it is clear that UTT exists and this information is an important 
consideration when analyzing trade data for the SSA countries. For the Foroutan and 
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Pritchett study, the fact that trade might be higher than their data showed would only 
further validate their finding that trade is higher than expected among SSA countries.  
As O’Connell (1997) points out, however, trade policies (including those 
governing RTAs) in Africa are often endogenous: they are largely influenced by 
macroeconomic variables (e.g., the balance of payments and the exchange rate) and, in 
turn, affect countries’ macroeconomic policy positions. Apart from the endogeneity 
problem, specification errors in the gravity model could lead to large margins of error in 
capturing the residual effect of RTAs. This problem may be compounded by the 
inaccuracy of African trade data (1990) 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Yang and Gupta 2005), 
African Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have not been effective in promoting trade 
or foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result, the IMF recommends significant changes 
in the Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) which include broad-based trade 
liberalization, domestic tax mobilization, infrastructure development for transport among 
African countries, reduction of the number of RTAs and focusing them on development, 
trade facilitation, investment protection, institution building and regulatory reforms.  
Yeats (1990) examines the quality of African trade data primarily from 1962 to 
1983. He determines the quality of data to be low though issues on both the export and 
import sides may mask the inconsistencies. Particular issues he notes are overvalued 
exchange rates, over-invoiced shipments and under-reported imports, time lags in 
reporting, differences in classification and valuation procedures, and not specifying the 
precise product detail. In addition, the routing country (or intermediate stop) may be 
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documented as the importing country.  Except when the data is misreported to the routing 
country, which then is over reported, the remaining discrepancies should result simply in 
underreporting.  Yeats (1998) provides a detailed discussion of the deficiencies of African 
trade data, which, as reported to the United Nations COMTRADE system, are often 
incomplete, out of date, missing, or even contradictory. On the other hand, data reported 
in the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics on Africa are up to date but contain data on 
aggregate trade only. 
Yeats (1994) proposes aggressive reform of African trade regimes in order to 
offset the changes that were planned as part of the Uruguay round of the WTO (expected 
as a result of removing tariff preferences).  Offsetting policies could include removing 
quotas and variable import levels on sugar and having African countries eliminate their 
own trade barriers, high tariffs. In subsequent analysis, Yeats (1998) notes that the SSA 
per capita domestic product decreased annually by 0.5% from 1973 to 1990. The 1998 
analysis examines trade complementarity and comparative advantage to assess 
opportunity for growth relate to regional trade agreements.  
In describing the lack of effective data to review opportunity for growth, Yeats 
notes that the most recent reporting years for the SSA countries varies from as early as 
1972 up to 1994. Yeats looks at non-oil exports and determines that SSA exports lack 
diversity and do not meet local needs which would drive regional trade. SSA countries 
have little to trade with each other. This non-complementarity means that trade does not 
cross regions.  Yeats also notes that there is a scarcity of manufacturing and capital goods 
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along with high tariff barriers. Yeats recommends policy changes related to trade and 
structural adjustment.  He does not assess the impact of government quality. 
According to Landman (2003), the concept of good governance arose within the 
late 1980s to early 1990s at the World Bank, with an initial economic focus, but was then 
expanded to include a political dimension, (including human rights protection) by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).  The World Bank (2000) explains that 
good governance has become more important due to demands of increasing competition, 
accountability and transparency worldwide. This has posed the challenge of defining 
good governance and what sets one country apart from another.  
In 2003, the European Commission commissioned an analysis of indicators for 
democracy, human rights and good governance. They defined good governance as, “the 
transparent and accountable management of all a country’s resources for its equitable and 
sustainable economic and social development” (Landman 2003, 2).  The concept is that a 
good government is one that complies with Adam Smith’s guidance that institutions 
enable individuals to pursue interests that drive overall growth (Smith 1776). 
The World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011) developed six 
indicators of good governance:  
1. Voice and Accountability –political, civil and human rights 
2. Political Instability and Violence –likelihood of violent threats to, or changes 
in, government, including terrorism 
3. Government Effectiveness –competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of 
public service delivery 
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4. Regulatory Burden – incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
5. Rule of Law – quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, and 
likelihood of crime and violence 
6. Control of Corruption –the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture 
The institutional quality indicator in the analysis is conducted from an average of 
the six indicators of good governance.  Countries included in the trade bloc analysis are 
all SSA countries for which export trade data is available for the selected years. Countries 
included in the institutional quality analysis are the same countries utilized in the trade 
bloc analysis.  
These six indicators are developed from a reduction technique called unobserved 
components model which is a variant of factor analysis that extracts components common 
to the 300 different measures in the original data (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2010 
2011). There is some criticism of the accuracy of these indicators, which is 
acknowledged by the team who developed the indicators. Because their data comes from 
so many different sources (the six indicators are a synthesis of 300 data elements), they 
do not have complete data for all the countries, and it is not always framed in the same 
manner. Landman (2003) says that it is like combining apples and oranges and calling the 
result pears. Kaufman (2005) in this explanation of the data explains that this is a 
problem, and that he continues to try to improve the data each year. He provides detail on 
which data is available from which source and when, and he states that with the large 
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margin of error, the data is not meant to be used to compare individual countries with 
each other, especially those countries that fall towards the middle. They firmly believe 
that those countries that are high, low and in the middle are where they belong, but the 
subtleties of the individual rankings are not so firm.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Gravity Model 
Credit is given to both Jan Tinbergen and Pentti Pöyhönen in the early 1960s for 
concurrently and independently developing the gravity model of international trade 
(Sandberg 2006). Tinbergen (1962) identifies the gravity model in order to examine the 
flow of trade between two countries utilizing three primary indicators: the gross national 
product (GNP) of the exporting country, the GNP of the importing country, and distance. 
Tinbergen further explains the justification for these three indicators, the export GNP 
indicates the size of a country’s market (or the amount that can be sold), the import GNP 
indicates the amount a country can buy (or the country’s market) and distance is a proxy 
for transportation costs. 
Sandberg (2006) sums up the work on gravity model theory that has been 
conducted over an almost 40 year period and notes that the gravity model can be derived 
from both a partial general equilibrium framework and from an international expenditure 
system. He says that it has some basis in Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory and theories of 
increasing return.  
While the Gravity Model had been developed decades previously, Anderson 
(1979, 108) was the first to document theoretical foundation for the gravity model. He 
says the simplest view of the gravity model is a rearrangement of a Cobb-Douglas 
expenditure system with one good for each country, “The gravity equation is a silly 
specification from an econometric standpoint since it substitutes out the share (which in 
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the Cobb-Douglas case is the only parameter).” Deardorff (1998), considered the gravity 
model with the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. Deardorff assumes that bilateral trade 
preferences are similar to Cobb-Douglas. He uses two extreme cases of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, one with frictionless trade and the second with countries that each produce 
different goods. He determines that it is not difficult to justify the gravity equation with 
standard trade theories such as Heckscher-Ohlin and Cobb-Douglas. He also says that 
because the gravity equation characterizes a large class of models, using it for empirical 
testing of any of the models is suspect. 
Though costs of transportation have declined dramatically over the past 200 years, 
costs of trade continue to be important explanatory variables for trade between countries.  
Distance does not change over time. Therefore, seeing a declining regression coefficient 
of geographic distance over time indicates a decline in the marginal effect of distance 
between trading partners (Junius 1999).  According to Pomfret (1997), distance is a 
strong factor in the size of bilateral trade flows, though at the same time distance is 
largely ignored in trade theory.  
As the gravity model has evolved, it now includes variables to address effects 
beyond size and distance. Four factors that are all considered to impact trade costs and 
trade preference are: natural barriers related to physical geography – distance, mountains, 
coastal - grouped together as transport costs; trade policy measures, or those with an 
environmental focus, as well as exchange rate transaction costs for countries that do not 
share the same currency; information costs and cultural differences. All of these factors 
restrict trade, but they also simplify the actuality of trade barriers by not accounting for 
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more complex differences such as those from protectionist policies, transportation 
infrastructure and insufficient explanation for border effects (Combes, Mayer and Thisse 
2008). 
Effects of contiguity and common language are usually large and are estimated to 
multiply trade by 2 and 2.6 respectively. Contiguity and common-language effects have 
increased over time, so that sharing a common language or border has an impact on trade 
that is higher now than it was thirty, forty, or fifty years ago (Combes, Mayer, and Thisse 
2008).  
In the gravity model, relationships are examined between each country and each 
of the other countries being examined, so that for the n countries there are (n*(n-1)) 
relationships. Aitken (1973) describes the gravity model as a cross-sectional trade flow 
model.  He explains that the gravity model of bilateral trade is inspired by Newton’s 
equation of gravity in physics, which relates the gravity force with which two bodies 
attract each other proportionately to the product of their masses, and inversely to the 
square of their distance.  The analogy of this to trade is that countries that are larger (by 
GDP and population), and those that are closer to each other, have a larger gravity, and 
the greater the gravitational pull or attraction, the greater the trade. The gravity model 
analyzes trade between a pair of countries as an increasing function of incomes (size) and 
a decreasing function of their distance. 
A seminal paper on the use of the gravity model is Aitken’s (1973) analysis of the 
integration effects of the EEC and EFTA.  Utilizing the gravity model to analyze each 
year between 1951 and 1967, Aitken is able to pinpoint when the effects of integration 
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began for each preferential trade arrangement, and is able to identify gross trade creation 
within each.  His analysis uses the following variables: 
Log Xij = log 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log Dij + 𝛽2 log Yi + 𝛽3 log Yj + 𝛽4 log Ni + 𝛽5 log Nj + 
𝛽6 log Aij + 𝛽7 log Pij EEC + 𝛽8 log Pij EFTA + log 𝑒ij 
X – country i’s exports to country j measured according to country j’s import data 
Dij is distance between commercial centers 
Yi and Yj are nominal GNP  
Ni and Nj are the populations 
Aij is dummy for adjacent 
Pij EEC and Pij EFTA are dummies for trade agreements with EEC and EFTA  
Sandberg’s 2004 analysis utilizes the gravity model to assess bilateral trade 
impacts of the CARICOM agreement in the Caribbean. His model contains the following 
variables:  
Xij
t – value of bilateral exports from country i to country j in period t.  
Dij - the physical distance between the two countries.  
Yi
t and Yj
t - measures of economic sizes of countries i and j in time t, 
respectively, measured by their GDPs.  
Ni
t and Nj
t - measures of the trading partners’ ‘physical’ sizes, measured by their 
respective populations in time.  
W captures any resistance or enhancement factors to trade.   
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Sandberg’s analysis found that exporters with larger populations have a larger 
productive base, have more opportunities for scale economies, and thus have a greater 
ability to export goods to the world market than do smaller countries. 
Research Questions 
This dissertation studies trade in Africa, particularly as it is impacted by regional 
trading blocs over time. It also examines impacts of institutional quality indicators which 
have begun to be utilized with the gravity model in trade analysis only in recent years.  
The research questions are as follows: 
1. Does membership in an SSA trade bloc increase trade in SSA countries?  
2. Does membership in an SSA trade bloc increase trade between member 
countries of the same bloc?  
3. Does institutional quality affect trade in SSA countries? 
Hypotheses 
H1: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade for SSA countries. 
Countries that are members of SADC, COMESA, EAC or ECOWAS 
experience higher trade than countries that are not members of one of these trade 
blocs. 
H2: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade between members of the 
trade bloc. 
Trade with countries within the trading blocs (member-to-member) is increasing 
among SSA member countries more than trade with countries outside of the trading 
bloc. Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) indicate customs unions, which are components 
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of trading bloc agreements, may benefit member countries more than the benefits of a 
unilateral tariff reduction due to better terms of trade. A number of studies have utilized 
the gravity model to assess impact of trading blocs on trade, including Sandberg (2006), 
which is specific to the CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market) 
trading group in the Caribbean, and Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) and Hanink and 
Owusu (1998), which both assess sub-Saharan Africa.  
Sandberg (2006) shows that membership in the CARICOM trading bloc has a 
strong intra-CARICOM effect on trade. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) find that the low 
degree of trade among SSA countries explained by their low GDPs and that intra-SSA 
trade is actually higher than expected given their determinants. At the same time, they 
only find one trading bloc with significant influence, CEAO, in their 1980-82 analysis. 
The intent of Hanink and Owusu (1998) is specifically to determine whether there is 
intra-regional trade potential in the least developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa by 
asking whether ECOWAS had promoted trade among its members. They determine from 
their study that ECOWAS had not had an impact on trade among its members. They were 
looking at trade from 1973 and 1993, and it is possible that drivers of trade have evolved 
since then.  
Hanink and Owusu (1998) state that customs unions are generally able to create 
trade due to decreases in transaction costs that result from either comparative advantage 
or increasing returns in differentiated markets. They choose to examine ECOWAS 
because relative factor costs are identical due to abundance of labor and shortage of 
capital, thus they should have weak opportunity for trade growth based on comparative 
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advantage or differentiated markets. Additional challenges are the uneven sizes of 
member countries, high transaction costs, lack of common language or currency. In their 
research, they determine that trade has not been much influenced by the ECOWAS 
agreement.   
Musila (2005) uses the gravity model to assess trade creation and trade diversion 
in COMESA, ECCAS and ECOWAS and finds that trade creation is statistically 
significant in both COMESA and ECOWAS for the years 1991-1998.  Gbetnkom (2006) 
utilizes the gravity model to determine that belonging to ECOWAS fosters trade, 
positioning this analysis after Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) liberalization 
reforms were enacted. 
H3: Institutional quality affects trade in SSA countries. 
The average of the World Bank’s Governance Matters indicators of 
institutional quality is a significant effect of low trade in Africa. 
Variables  
The gravity model is the basic tool of analysis within this dissertation.  This is the 
basic model, and variations are conducted based on the hypothesis and utilizing a single 
variable to show participation in any trade bloc versus a variable for each trade bloc, or 
utilizing the individual institutional quality indicators versus the average variable.  
Log Xij = β0 + β1 logYi + β2 logYj + β3 logNi  + β4 logNj + β5 logDij + β6 logAij + 
β7 logLOij + β8 logLEij + β9 logEDi + β10 logEDj + β11 logPTAi + β12 logPTAij + β13 
logGOVAi + β14 logGOVAj + log 𝑒ij 
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Yi and Yj and Ni and Nj are GDP and population of the exporting and importing 
countries respectively. Dij is distance between commercial centers of the exporting and 
importing countries. Aij is a dummy for adjacent borders between the exporting and 
importing countries. LOij is a dummy for common official language between the 
exporting and importing countries. LEij is a dummy for common ethnic language. PTAi is 
a dummy for when exporting country is a member of an SSA PTA. PTAij is a dummy for 
when both exporter and importer are members of an SSA PTA. GOVAi is the average 
institutional indicator for the exporting country. GOVAj is the average institutional 
indicator for the importing country. The last term is the stochastic error term, which 
captures all other (omitted) effects on trade and is assumed to be well-behaved. 
Dependent Variable – Bilateral Exports 
The dependent variable Xij for this analysis is bilateral exports from each 
exporting country i to each importing country j. Export data between countries was 
collected from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOT) database (International Monetary Fund 2014). 
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Table 3.1 
Total Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa and to World by Country, 2001-2005 
 
Country 
 
 
Exports to Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
% Exports 
to SSA 
 
Exports to 
World 
 
Angola 125,258,363 1.16% 10,757,638,241 
Benin 141,058,034 41.59% 339,162,506 
Burkina Faso 147,888,686 56.31% 262,643,713 
Burundi 6,050,201 13.98% 43,268,747 
Cameroon 240,850,824 9.48% 2,540,620,470 
Cape Verde 170,089 1.30% 13,081,290 
Central African Republic 12,965,874 8.70% 148,988,753 
Chad 4,140,603 0.63% 657,418,561 
Comoros 414,211 1.28% 32,484,781 
Congo, DR 71,171,067 5.98% 1,189,978,048 
Congo, Republic of 55,669,956 2.38% 2,336,845,189 
Cote d'Ivoire 1,541,956,138 27.39% 5,629,020,863 
Djibouti 55,535,343 22.68% 244,834,406 
Equatorial Guinea 9,050,430 0.28% 3,214,570,171 
Ethiopia 1,498,219 0.30% 505,503,605 
Gabon 108,740,886 2.75% 3,948,096,816 
Gambia, The 2,658,278 9.29% 28,613,460 
Ghana 168,524,266 8.54% 1,973,686,360 
Guinea 39,641,104 5.11% 775,778,956 
Guinea-Bissau 11,502,381 12.42% 92,583,405 
Kenya 952,465,217 37.42% 2,545,441,823 
Liberia 11,140,999 1.12% 998,014,094 
Madagascar 49,791,666 5.68% 877,275,886 
Malawi 97,232,566 19.84% 489,978,922 
Mali 9,891,079 4.52% 218,752,216 
Mauritania 111,799,816 16.17% 691,431,942 
Mauritius 161,700,045 8.97% 1,802,905,201 
Mozambique 254,790,917 22.43% 1,135,749,267 
Niger 75,558,397 35.97% 210,077,376 
Nigeria 2,359,425,023 8.58% 27,512,594,467 
Rwanda 5,580,924 2.84% 196,383,234 
Sao Tome and Principe 335,184 2.83% 11,848,768 
Senegal 377,055,765 33.60% 1,122,334,740 
Seychelles 10,629,490 3.99% 266,387,832 
Sierra Leone 7,659,526 5.62% 136,300,368 
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Table 3.1 (continued). 
 
Country 
 
 
Exports to Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
% Exports 
to SSA 
 
Exports to World 
 
Somalia 8,190,158 5.30% 154,595,501 
South Africa 5,004,907,349 12.97% 38,578,972,990 
Sudan 28,653,560 0.97% 2,967,352,818 
Tanzania 169,208,484 15.71% 1,077,214,954 
Togo 206,723,825 62.32% 331,732,961 
Uganda 175,173,884 30.00% 583,819,185 
Zambia 515,987,939 41.50% 1,243,379,599 
Zimbabwe 681,904,005 31.71% 2,150,167,151 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13,820,949,587 11.92% 115,995,712,196 
World 104,779,724,134 1.32% 7,925,594,516,763 
 
Independent Variables  
The independent variables for this model are: the distance between the major 
cities of the exporting and importing countries; the GDP and the population of the 
exporting and importing countries; and the following possible resistant or enhancement 
factors to trade: dummy variables for whether or not the countries share a common 
border, whether or not the countries have a common official or ethnic language, whether 
or not the exporting or both countries are SADC, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS or ECOWAS 
members; and quality of institutions of the exporting and importing country.   
1. Distance between countries (Dij) 
Transaction costs in the gravity model are represented by distance between the 
two countries, dist, calculated as the distance between the major cities of the two 
countries, as the crow flies, in kilometers, The shorter the distance between trading 
partners, the lower the resistance or impediments to trade, which would be associated 
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with higher levels of trade, and vice versa (Gbetnkom 2006). Distance is expected to 
increase transport costs and impede the flow of trade across countries (M. A. Babatunde 
2006). Data on distance between all country pairs were obtained from the Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) (2014)which has a 
downloadable file that contains these variables and relationships between all country 
pairs. 
2. GDP (Yi /Yj) and population (Ni / Nj) of both the exporting and importing 
countries.  
GDP and population represent the economic mass of the two countries (Burger, 
van Oort and Linders 2009).  Higher income level indicates greater potential supply from 
the exporting country and increased demand of the importing country, which would lead 
to a positive effect on trade. If the population is large, it would be expected to increase 
the ratio of domestic to foreign market production, and thus allow greater output 
diversification. With greater output diversification, there would be lower potential 
demand in the importing country and lower potential supply from the exporting country, 
and an overall decrease in imports. (Sandberg 2006). In using GDP as a variable, 
Gbentkom (2006) says a high level of income indicates a high level of production for the 
exporter and increases availability of export goods. In this instance, GDP is generally 
positively related to trade, though there are scenarios when larger countries trade less 
because they have resources available domestically.  
Anderson (1979) stresses the importance of using both GDP and population by 
stating that GDP and population together determine the potential export supply of a 
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country – GDP determines economic capacity and population determines domestic 
market/foreign market production ratio. It has also been argued (Bergstrand 1985) that 
GDP per capita can be used, as a proxy for the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country 
and a demand factor for the importing country. GDP and population were accessed from 
the World Bank World Development Indicators (2014) in current U.S. dollars.  
Table 3.2  
GDP for Selected Countries, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 with percent growth 1980 to 2010 
 
Country 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
2010 
 
 
Growth 
1980-2010 
 
Algeria 42,345 62,045 54,790 161,207 281% 
Angola  10,000 9,130 82,471  
Armenia  2,257 1,912 9,260  
Australia 149,679 310,945 414,987 1,141,268 662% 
Bangladesh 18,115 31,219 53,370 115,279 536% 
Belize 195 413 832 1,397 617% 
Benin 1,405 1,960 2,359 6,562 367% 
Brazil  461,952 657,216 2,209,400  
Burkina Faso 1,929 3,101 2,633 8,980 366% 
Burundi 920 1,132 870 2,027 120% 
Cabo Verde 142 307 539 1,664 1070% 
Cambodia   3,654 11,242  
Cameroon 6,741 11,152 9,287 23,622 250% 
Canada 273,437 592,015 739,456 1,614,014 490% 
Central African 
Republic 797 1,441 915 1,986 149% 
Chad 1,033 1,739 1,385 10,658 932% 
China, Mainland 189,650 358,973 1,205,261 6,039,659 3085% 
Comoros 124 250 202 530 330% 
Congo, DR   19,088 20,523  
Congo, Republic of 1,706 2,799 3,220 12,008 604% 
Cote d'Ivoire 10,176 10,796 10,717 24,885 145% 
Djibouti  452 551 1,129  
Egypt 22,912 43,130 99,839 218,888 855% 
Equatorial Guinea 51 112 1,046 11,564 22735% 
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Table 3.2 (continued). 
 
Country 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
2010 
 
 
Growth 
1980-2010 
 
Ethiopia  12,175 8,242 29,934  
Gabon 4,280 5,952 5,068 14,476 238% 
Gambia, The 241 317 783 952 295% 
Ghana 4,445 5,889 4,983 32,175 624% 
Guinea  2,667 2,995 4,736  
Guinea-Bissau 111 244 370 847 666% 
Kenya 7,265 8,572 12,705 40,000 451% 
Lebanon  2,838 17,260 38,010  
Liberia 855 384 529 1,293 51% 
Libya  28,905 38,271 74,773  
Madagascar 4,042 3,081 3,878 8,730 116% 
Malawi 1,238 1,881 1,744 5,399 336% 
Mali 1,787 2,421 2,422 9,422 427% 
Mauritania 709 1,020 1,294 4,338 512% 
Mauritius 1,137 2,653 4,583 9,718 755% 
Mexico 194,357 262,710 683,648 1,051,129 441% 
Morocco 21,079 28,839 37,021 90,770 331% 
Mozambique 3,526 2,512 4,310 10,119 187% 
Nicaragua 2,144 1,009 5,107 8,741 308% 
Niger 2,509 2,481 1,798 5,719 128% 
Nigeria 64,202 30,757 46,386 369,062 475% 
Rwanda 1,255 2,550 1,735 5,699 354% 
Sao Tome and 
Principe   77 201  
Saudi Arabia 164,542 116,778 188,442 526,811 220% 
Senegal 3,503 5,717 4,680 12,932 269% 
Seychelles 147 369 615 970 558% 
Sierra Leone 1,101 650 636 2,578 134% 
Somalia 604 917   -100% 
South Africa 80,547 112,015 136,362 375,349 366% 
Sudan 7,617 12,409 12,257 65,634 762% 
Tanzania  4,259 10,186 31,105  
Thailand 32,354 85,343 122,725 318,908 886% 
Togo 1,136 1,628 1,294 3,173 179% 
Uganda 1,245 4,304 6,193 18,804 1411% 
United Kingdom 564,948 1,093,169 1,548,664 2,407,857 326% 
United States 2,862,510 5,979,580 10,284,779 14,964,372 423% 
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Table 3.2 (continued). 
 
Country 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
2010 
 
 
Growth 
1980-2010 
 
Zambia 3,885 3,288 3,601 20,266 422% 
Zimbabwe 6,679 8,784 6,690 9,457 42% 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI). Data extracted from WDI Database on 7/19/15 
3. Resistant or Enhancement Factors to trade 
a) Shared border and language and colonizer (Aij, LOij, LEij) 
Variables which capture other common impacts on trade are captured by the 
following: Aij, adjacent, a dummy variable for whether or not the countries share a 
common border, LOij, a dummy variable for whether the countries share a common 
official language, LEij, a dummy variable for whether the countries share a common 
ethnic language. The dummy variables regarding shared language and shared border were 
obtained from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
(2014). 
b) Membership in a preferential trading agreement (PTAi, PTAij,)  
PTAi is a dummy variable for whether or not the exporter is a member of any of 
the selected African trading agreements, which include the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic 
Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS), and East African Community (EAC). 
PTAij is a dummy variable for whether both countries are members of an SSA trading 
agreement.  These variables are assumed to stimulate trade (Gbetnkom 2006). PTAi has a 
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value of one if the exporter belongs to a regional integration organization and zero if the 
exporter does not belong. PTAij is zero unless both countries belong to an SSA trade 
organization, in which case the value is one. Therefore, the second variable assesses trade 
creation within the community, and the first assesses impact on trade outside of the 
community, or trade diversion.   
c) Good Governance 
GOVAi and GOVAj are variables for the average of the six good governance 
indicators for the quality of institutions of the exporting and importing country. Data on 
good governance was taken from Good Governance Matters IV (Kraay, Kaufman, and 
Mastruzzi 2005). The institutional quality indicator is an average of the six indicators of 
good governance developed by the World Bank (Kraay, Kaufman, and Mastruzzi 2005).  
1. Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights 
2. Political Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats 
to, or changes in, government, including terrorism 
3. Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and 
the quality of public service delivery 
4. Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
5. Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6. Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private 
gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture 
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These six indicators are made up of components from 300 measures. Kaufman 
(2005) provides detail on which data is available from which source and when, and he 
states that with the large margin of error, the data is not meant to be used to compare 
individual countries with each other, especially those countries that fall towards the 
middle. He believes those countries that are high, low and in the middle are where they 
belong, but the subtleties of the individual rankings are not as firm. 
Table 3.3  
Descriptive statistics 2010  
Variable 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
 
Max 
 
Exports (M) 3401 708.97 9,977.41 0.00 290,054.00 
Aij 3401 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Loij 3401 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Leij 3401 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Dij 3401 5,938.57 3,965.94 10.48 18,008.29 
Yi (M) 3401 577,498.10 2,152,542.00 0.00 15,000,000.00 
Ni (M) 3401 58.89 181.41 0.09 1,337.71 
EDi 2000 60.54 30.60 13.83 130.84 
Yj (M) 3401 577,869.70 2,152,526.00 0.00 15,000,000.00 
Nj (M) 3401 58.83 181.41 0.09 1,337.71 
Edj 2017 60.39 30.58 13.83 130.84 
GOVAi 3401 -0.49 0.73 -2.11 1.61 
GOVAj 3401 -0.49 0.73 -2.11 1.61 
PTAi 3401 0.70 0.46 0 1 
PTAij 3401 0.70 0.46 0 1 
 
Participants 
Participants for the purposes of this paper will be countries. Countries included in 
the trade bloc analysis are 42 SSA countries for which export trade data is available for 
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the selected years, and 20 non-SSA countries. The dataset excludes cases where no 
bilateral trade is reported or values are missing so that the final sample includes 3,401 
observations for the 62 SSA and non-SSA countries. With 62 countries, there are a 
possible 3,782 observations, but the DOT data (2014) frequently returns no values when 
trade is not reported, so the total observations are 3,401. The time period is 2010 with 
comparison to data from 1980, 1990, and 2000.   
Table 3.4  
Countries included in the analysis 
 
SSA Countries 
 
1. Angola 
2. Benin 
3. Burkina Faso 
4. Burundi 
5. Cameroon 
6. Cape Verde 
7. Central African 
Republic 
8. Chad 
9. Comoros 
10. Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
11. Congo (Democratic 
Republic) 
12. Côte d'Ivoire 
13. Djibouti 
14. Equatorial 
Guinea 
15. Ethiopia 
16. Gabon 
17. The Gambia 
18. Ghana 
19. Guinea 
20. Guinea-
Bissau 
21. Kenya 
22. Liberia 
23. Madagascar 
24. Malawi 
25. Mali 
26. Mauritania 
27. Mozambique 
28. Niger 
29. Nigeria 
30. Rwanda 
31. Sao Tome 
and Principe 
32. Senegal 
33. Seychelles 
34. Sierra Leone 
35. Somalia 
36. South Africa 
37. Sudan 
38. Tanzania 
39. Togo 
40. Uganda 
41. Zambia 
42. Zimbabwe 
 
Additional Partner Countries 
 
 
1. Algeria 
2. Armenia 
3. Australia 
4. Bangladesh 
5. Belize 
6. Brazil 
7. Cambodia 
8. Canada 
9. China 
10. Egypt 
11. Libya 
12. Lebanon 
13. Mauritius 
14. Mexico 
15. Morocco 
16. Nicaragua 
17. Saudi Arabia 
18. Thailand 
19. United Kingdom 
20. United States
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The data cover the period from 1980 to 2010 in ten year increments. Each country 
pair has two observations, one with each country as exporter. Bilateral Data includes: 
dependent variable, Exports (Xij), Distance (Dij), Common border (Aij), common 
language (LOij and LEij), and preferential trading agreement of both trading partners 
(PTAij). Country-specific data includes: GDP, Population, preferential trading agreement 
of the exporter only (PTAi), and Government Indicator average (GOVAi and GOVAj). 
Methodology 
This dissertation utilizes regression analysis to assess the impacts of regional 
trading blocs and institutional quality on trade. The model uses OLS and Tobit regression 
in ten year increments, beginning with the most recent data in 2010.  
Limitations 
There is some debate over the appropriate analytical method for analyzing trade 
data with the gravity model. There are zeroes in the export data, sometimes when there 
truly is trade but it is unreported. The zeroes result in challenges in analyzing the data. 
Zeroes could be discarded, but might compromise the economic analysis since it may be 
important that there was no data for these particular entries. Hanink and Owusu (1998) 
and others addressed this by using Tobit regression, which treats zero or unrecorded trade 
flows as unobserved data points (Gbetnkom 2006). Tobit has its ownchallenges because 
certain elements of analysis, such as the R-squared, are missed.  Sandberg (2006), on the 
other hand, chose to address this by adding ‘1’ to all values. His dataset contained 247 
zero observations out of 3,454 total observations. In adding 1, he defines exports = X*ijt = 
(Xijt + 1) which makes empirical observation possible. The perception is that any 
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distortion is insignificant, because the variation in data is in the thousands, so adding one 
to each number is not going to impact the results but not including the one is likely to 
bias the results. 
While some propose that it is necessary to utilize Tobit regression for gravity 
model analysis where the data contains many zero values, Subramanian and Tamirisa 
(2003) suggest that the approach of using Tobit regression confers unduly large weights 
on the adjusted zero-value observations. For example, Cape Verde, which had no trade at 
all, should be reflected as zero. Sierra Leone and Liberia, which were undergoing 
extenuating circumstances of physical conflict during the trade year selected (1993), 
could potentially have been removed from the sample altogether, and another option 
would be to conduct at least two separate analyses, with and without those countries.  
In addition, another limitation would be that this analysis is reflective of officially 
reported trade and would not include any unrecorded trans-border trade (UTT). The 
assumption is that the official data represent relative values of trade accurately even if 
they do not provide the complete picture. Thus, they would provide relative values within 
and across SSA countries, where it can be assumed that levels of UTT are fairly similar 
across countries. Differences would only be more marked increases in export values if the 
UTT could be estimated. As noted in Chapter II, the UTT serves to move the SSA 
countries away from the undesired Nash equilibrium and closer to a mutually beneficial 
contract point.  
 
 
62 
 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
 The gravity model for this paper states that the trade between two countries is a 
function of the GDP and population of both the exporting and importing countries, the 
distance between the major cities of the two countries, existence of shared border, 
commonality of official or ethnic language, membership in different sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) trade agreements such as ECOWAS, COMESA, EAC, SADC or ECCAS, and the 
quality of institutions of the exporting and importing countries.  Each country pair is 
reflected with two observations, one with each trading partner as exporter. Bilateral data 
includes: Distance, Common border, common language, common colonizer, and 
Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA).  Country-specific data includes: Exports, GDP, 
population, participation in preferential trade agreement by the exporter or both exporter 
and importer, and average governance indicator for the six individual governance 
indicators for the exporter and the importer. 
 The gravity model is a standard model used to analyze international trade among 
countries. The gravity model is intended to assess barriers to trade such as the transaction 
cost of trade. In order to understand barriers to trade and their impacts, it is necessary to 
understand all of the costs involving trade over geographical space. Thus, the theory 
should be inclusive of all costs, including costs associated with lack of face-to-face 
contact, more complex, expensive communications, information gathering, and different 
languages, legal systems, product standards, and cultures. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 
(1999) believe that these costs of trade are evident in the trade data. The gravity model 
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begins from the information that trade decreases with distance, and this implies that costs 
are higher with greater distance.  Distance becomes a proxy for transport costs, transport 
time (addressing perishability, adaptability to market conditions, and irregularities in 
supply), and psychic distance (addressing familiarity with laws, institutions, and habits) 
(Junius 1999). Junius states that the closer two countries are to each other, the greater are 
the regional cultural similarities that make trade easier. 
 A number of studies have utilized the gravity model to assess the impact of 
trading blocs on trade, including Sandberg (2006), who examines CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community and Common Market) trading group in the Caribbean, Foroutan and Pritchett 
(1993), and Hanink and Owusu (1998), both assess SSA countries. Sandberg (2006) 
shows that membership in the CARICOM trading bloc has a strong intra-CARICOM 
effect on trade. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) find that the low degree of trade among 
SSA countries is explained by their low GDPs and that intra-SSA trade is actually higher 
than expected given their determinants. At the same time, they only find one trading bloc 
with significant influence, CEAO (Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) a 
West African monetary community which no longer exists and was succeeded in 1994 by 
UEOMA (Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine). In their 1980-82 analysis. 
Hanink and Owusu (1998) state that customs unions are generally able to create trade due 
to decreases in transaction costs and tariffs that result from either comparative advantage 
or increasing returns in differentiated markets. Musila (2005) uses the gravity model to 
assess trade creation and trade diversion in COMESA, ECCAS and ECOWAS and finds 
that trade creation is statistically significant in both COMESA and ECOWAS for the 
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years 1991-1998.  Gbetnkom (2006) utilizes the gravity model to determine that 
belonging to ECOWAS, after Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) liberalization 
reforms were enacted, fosters trade. The gravity model is utilized to test the hypotheses in 
this dissertation.  
H1: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade for SSA countries. 
Countries that are members of active trading blocs in Sub-Saharan Africa (SADC, 
COMESA, EAC or ECOWAS) experience more trade than countries that are not 
members of one of these trade blocs. As stated by the Centre for Democracy and 
Development (2002) a regional trade agreement, or ‘regionalism’, is defined by 
geographically proximal countries with common objectives for economic or political co-
operation among themselves to improve their standing. 
Between 1995 and 2005, there have been changes in African economics. 
According to Arbache, Page, and Go (2008), SSA leaders are taking increasing control of 
their economic destiny. After 45 years of stagnation, improvements are being made but 
the authors do not believe these changes are resulting in significant improvements in 
economic development. H1 examines whether these changes may be driving increased 
trade by examining the overall impacts of regional trading with countries outside the 
trading bloc. This paper focuses on countries and active trading blocs in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
H2: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade between members of the trade 
bloc. 
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 Trade among countries within the trading blocs (member-to-member) is 
increasing among SSA member countries more than trade between countries within the 
trading bloc and countries outside of the trading bloc. This would indicate that 
membership in the trade bloc creates trade, which is an intent for a trade bloc. 
This analysis focuses on whether the exporter is a member of a selected African 
trading agreement (including Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC) or Economic 
Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS) ), or both countries are members of the 
same trading agreement.  Membership in a trading bloc is intended to stimulate trade 
(Gbetnkom 2006).  Utilizing membership in a trading bloc for analysis is considered a 
method to assess trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation is a net increase in 
trade where more expensive domestic goods are now purchased at a lower price via the 
terms of a trade agreement (generally due to the reduction in tariffs).   
When the preferential trade agreement variable in which both trading partners are 
members of an SSA trade agreement (PTAij) is positive, it reflects trade creation. Trade 
creation is when there is more trade between trading partners than predicted by the other 
variables in the model, and where the cost of the good is now lower because of the tariff 
reduction.  Trade diversion, on the other hand, is when trade moves from a lower cost 
partner who is not a member of the trading bloc to a higher cost partner who is a member 
of the trading bloc. When PTAi is negative, then that shows that trade is diverted from a 
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lower cost external partner to a lower cost member partner, thus reflecting trade 
diversion. (Kanda and Jordaan 2010).  
H3: Institutional quality affects trade in SSA countries. The average of the World 
Bank’s Governance Matters indicators of institutional quality has a significant 
effect on trade in Africa.   
A nation with effective institutions and an open economy should experience 
economic growth and development (Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana 2007). Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2004) and North (1990) identify that economic institutions are 
the determining factor for whether a country is able to develop and grow, and they focus 
particularly on the importance of such institutions as property rights and open markets. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) point out that economic institutions are 
important for growth, and can guide how that growth is managed.  They define good 
economic institutions as ‘those that provide security of property rights and relatively 
equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society’.  Diop, Dufrenot, 
and Sanon (2010) state that failures of governance and institutions can explain lack of 
growth in the ECOWAS (West African) countries. 
 Effective governance is analyzed utilizing the gravity model with the Good 
Governance Matters indicators developed by the World Bank beginning in 2005 (Kraay, 
Kaufman, and Mastruzzi 2005).  De Groot et al (2004) find that institutional quality has a 
significant, positive and substantial impact on bilateral trade flows. De Groot also 
determines that countries with more similar institutions are more likely to trade with each 
other, so that institutions with lower governance quality might do more trade with each 
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other, and lower quality would drive increased trade in that instance.  Lavallee (2005) 
utilizes data from 21 OECD and 95 developing countries to analyze the effects of 
governance on trade, also including membership in a free trade agreement. Lavallee 
utilizes this analysis to demonstrate that poor governance reduces the amount of trade 
that a country has with an industrialized nation.  
Data on good governance is obtained from Good Governance Matters IV (Kraay, 
Kaufman, and Mastruzzi 2005). The institutional quality indicator is  the average of the 
six indicators of good governance developed by the World Bank (Kraay, Kaufman, and 
Mastruzzi 2005):   Voice and Accountability – political, civil and human rights; Political 
Instability and Violence – likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government; 
Government Effectiveness – competence of the bureaucracy and quality of public service; 
Regulatory Burden –market-unfriendly policies; Rule of Law – quality of contract 
enforcement, police, and courts; Control of Corruption – exercise of public power for 
private gain. These six indicators are developed from extracts of components common to 
300 different measures (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011). Kray, Kaufman, and 
Mastruzzi (2005) provide detail on the data sources and timing.  They state that with the 
margin of error, the data is not meant to be used to compare individual countries with 
each other, especially those countries that fall towards the middle. The overall structure 
showing top, middle and bottom countries, is valid, but that comparing two countries 
ranked next to each other, particularly in the middle, is not refined to that degree. 
 This analysis includes 42 SSA countries and 20 non-SSA countries. Exports are 
used as an indicator of quantity of trade. In the gravity model, those exports are utilized 
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bilaterally – from each country in the analysis to each other country in the analysis. . 
Export data between countries are from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) 
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) database. 
This paper utilizes regression analysis to assess the impacts of regional trading 
blocs and institutional quality on trade. The model conducts OLS regression on the 
exports from 1980 to 2010 in 10 year increments, and follows with comparison to a Tobit 
analysis. Data in 1980 and 1990 only apply to trade agreement data, as the good 
governance dataset begins in the mid-1990s.  Export data have numerous instances of 
zero trades between two individual countries. Some of these may be truly zero trade 
between countries, but others may reflect either poor reporting or specific instances of 
turmoil in a given country, such as civil war which may only last for one to two years. 
Several authors have recommended Tobit analysis, which replaces the zeroes with a 
small number (i.e., 0.1) to address the lack of trade values (Foroutan and Pritchett 1993) 
(Hanink and Owusu 1998). 
With 62 countries (SSA and non-SSA), there are a possible 3,782 (n*(n-1)) 
observations because there are 62 countries each exporting to 61 partner countries), but 
the DOT data frequently returns no values when trade is not reported, so the total 
observations extracted from the DOT database for exports between these countries are 
3,402.  The data covers 2010, with comparison to data from 1980 to 2000 in ten year 
increments. The data include the countries listed in table 3.4. Selected countries include 
SSA countries and countries that were included in similar studies that included non-SSA 
countries by Kanda and Jordaan (2010), and Subramanian and Tamirisa (2003). 
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During the 1980 to 2010 time period of this study, world growth (GDP, current 
US$) increased 487%, growth in the United States was 422%, and growth across all SSA 
countries was 396%. Growth across the countries in the study ranged from a low of 42% 
(Zimbabwe) to an extreme high of 22,735% (Equatorial Guinea) and the next highest of 
1,411% (Uganda) (World Bank 1980-2010). Several countries were not included in the 
growth analysis because they had no data reported in either 1980 (Angola, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Tanzania) or 
2010 (Somalia). When looking at average growth in just the developing countries in SSA, 
the growth rate was only slightly lower than the total SSA growth rate, at 392%, which is 
an indicator that the lowest income countries are keeping pace with the higher income 
SSA countries. In the most recent ten years of the study, from 2000 to 2010, the SSA 
growth was 268% and the developing countries only two percent lower at 266%.  This 
shows that two-thirds of the growth in that 30 year period was in the most recent ten year 
period. 
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Chart 4.1. Average GDP vs Growth, SSA Countries, 2001 to 2005 (removed outlier 
Equatorial Guinea with 7000% growth) 
In Chart 4.1, countries are clearly clustered in the lower left hand corner of the 
chart. There is an amount of variation in the 100 to 300 percent growth range. Then there 
are a few anomalies that exceeded 400% growth. 
The SSA countries with the highest current GDP are South Africa (375B) and 
Nigeria (369B), and those with the lowest GDP are Sao Tome and Principe (201M) and 
Comoros (530M).  When population is incorporated to assess growth in GDP per capita, 
the highest growth is in Equatorial Guinea (7,136%) and Cape Verde (624%). The lowest 
GDP growth rates are negative, including Liberia (-28%), Zimbabwe (-21%) and Niger (-
16%). In the last 10 years examined, 2000 to 2010, the highest growth was in Angola 
(543%) and Equatorial Guinea (723%), and the lowest growth was in the Gambia (-11%) 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (-19%). Of note, all other growth rates from 
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2000 to 2010 were positive, whereas in the longer period from 1980 to 2010 there were 
five countries with negative growth rates.   
Table 4.1 
Lowest and highest growth SSA countries, 1980 to 2010  
Lowest Growth Growth 1980-2010 Trade Agreement 
Somalia -100% none 
Zimbabwe 42% COMESA & SADC 
Liberia 51% ECOWAS 
Madagascar 116% COMESA 
Burundi 120% COMESA, EAC, ECCAS 
      
Highest Growth Over 200% Trade Agreement 
Sudan 762% COMESA 
Chad 932% ECCAS 
Cape Verde 1070% ECOWAS 
Uganda 1411% COMESA 
Equatorial Guinea 22735% ECCAS 
 
Arbache, Go, and Page (2008) identify an acceleration of growth in African 
countries that begins after the mid-1990s. Arbache, Go, and Page examine whether 
increase in African growth is an indicator of reversal of decades of development and 
growth failures. The analysis determines that sustainability is precarious due to stagnant 
savings, investment, productivity, and export diversification. Arbache, Go, and Page also 
note that growth is seen in almost every category of country that he examines – oil-
importing and oil-exporting, coastal and landlocked, with some growth in what he 
describes as fragile countries as well. The fragile countries, those without significant oil 
resources, showed the most growth between 2004 and 2006. 
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Chart 4.2.  Average GDP per person and percent growth from 1980 to 2010 (removed 
outlier Equatorial Guinea with 7000% growth) 
In Chart 4.2 it is possible to see that growth is happening everywhere in SSA 
countries and at different rates. With the countries arranged in order of average GDP PP, 
the greatest growth is seen almost at the far left, but then there are spikes of growth along 
almost the complete length of the chart. 
African countries are benefitting from higher oil prices, rising non-oil commodity 
prices, increased foreign aid, leadership reforms, trade improvements and tariff 
reductions, and increased school enrollments and literacy rates (Arbache, Go, and Page 
2008). Arbache, Go, and Page summarize that in order to sustain the growth, African 
countries will need more exports, private sector growth, productivity, foreign investment 
and remittances, and more. They claim these goals will be achieved with reform and 
improvements in governance. 
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The gravity model equation for this analysis is as follows: 
Log Xij = β0 + β1 logYi + β2 logYj + β3 logNi + β4 logNj+ β5 logDij + β6 logAij + β7 
logLOij + β8 logLEij + β9 logEDi + β10 logEDj + β11 logPTAi + β12 logPTAij + β13 
logGOVAi + β14 logGOVAj + log 𝑒ij 
The dependent variable is represented by Xij, which represents total exports from 
exporting country (i) to importing country (j). 
Yi and Yj are GDP of the exporting and importing countries respectively.  
Ni and Nj are Population of the exporting and importing countries respectively. 
Dij is distance between capitals of the exporting and importing countries.  
Aij is the dummy for adjacent borders between the exporting and importing 
countries.  
LOij is a dummy for common ofnficial language between the exporting and 
importing countries.  
LEij is a dummy for common ethnic language between the exporting and 
importing countries. 
EDi is secondary education level of exporting country 
EDj is secondary education level of importing country 
PTAi is a dummy for exporting country member of an SSA preferential trade 
agreement (PTA).  
PTAij is a dummy for both countries members of an SSA preferential trade 
agreement (PTA).  
GOVAi is the average institutional indicator for the exporting country.  
GOVAj is the average institutional indicator for the importing country.  
𝑒ij - the final term is the stochastic error term, which captures all other (omitted) 
effects on trade and is assumed to be well-behaved.  
Expected signs of the regression output are as follows: 
              +     +/-    +      +/-    -      +         +          +           +/-           +/-            +/-                 +/- 
Xij = F ( Yi, Ni, Yj, Nj, Dij, Aij, LOij, LEij, PTAi,PTAij, GOVAi, GOVAj ) 
 
GDP is expected to be positive, since larger economies would have more volume 
and diversity of opportunities for trade. Population could be either positive or negative 
because smaller countries may need to trade more because of lack of access to products, 
or may trade less because of lack of resources. Some large countries may trade less 
because they are able to generate their own goods, or may drive more trade because of 
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their resources. Aij (common border) is expected to be positive, as two countries that 
share a border should have more opportunity for trade. Dij (Distance between two 
countries) is expected to be negative because the greater the distance between two 
countries, the higher the cost of trade and the lower the opportunity to trade. Common 
language, official or ethnic, would be expected to be positive, because language 
differences can be a barrier to trade. The direction of this paper and the results of prior 
studies would indicate that the impact of the preferential tradse agreement as well as 
quality of governance would be positive, but it is the objective of this analysis to assess 
impacts of these variables. 
The gravity model analysis evaluates the level of trade among each set of trading 
partners. Results from this analysis begin with Table 4.3. Hypotheses are repeated for 
reference and analysis below relates to the listed hypotheses. 
Test of H1: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade for SSA countries 
and H2: Membership of the exporting country in an SSA trade bloc increases trade for 
the trade bloc members. 
Regression analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between exports 
and various potential predictors. The tables below summarize the descriptive statistics 
and analysis results.  The variable PTAi is tested here, which evaluates effects on trade 
when the exporter is a member of an SSA trading bloc. 
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables for Trade Analysis, 
2010 
Variable 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
 
Max 
 
Exports (M) 3401 708.97 9,977.41 0.00 290,054.00 
Aij 3401 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Loij 3401 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Leij 3401 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Dij 3401 5,938.57 3,965.94 10.48 18,008.29 
Yi (M) 3401 577,498.10 2,152,542.00 0.00 15,000,000.00 
Ni (M) 3401 58.89 181.41 0.09 1,337.71 
EDi 2000 60.54 30.60 13.83 130.84 
Yj (M) 3401 577,869.70 2,152,526.00 0.00 15,000,000.00 
Nj (M) 3401 58.83 181.41 0.09 1,337.71 
Edj 2017 60.39 30.58 13.83 130.84 
GOVAi 3401 -0.49 0.73 -2.11 1.61 
GOVAj 3401 -0.49 0.73 -2.11 1.61 
PTAi 3401 0.70 0.46 0 1 
PTAij 3401 0.70 0.46 0 1 
 
Per discussion from Kanda (2010) , there is both trade creation and trade 
expansion if both PTAi (the exporter is a member of a PTA) and PTAij (both trade 
partners are member of a PTA) variables are positive. There is trade diversion when 
PTAij is positive and PTAi is negative, and there is trade expansion if PTAij is negative 
and PTAi is positive. 
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Table 4.3 
Impact of SSA Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) on International Trade, 2010 and 
2000, OLS Regression 
  
 
2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
 
 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
                  
Aij 12994.99 6.49 0.000 * 9086.96 8.41 0.000 * 
LOij -1590.31 -1.12 0.262   -642.24 -0.96 0.336   
LEij 1695.63 1.15 0.250   835.63 1.19 0.235   
Dij -0.559 -4.19 0.000 * -0.278 -4.22 0.000 * 
Yi 0.001 4.98 0.000 * 0.001 5.53 0.000 * 
Ni 5.46 2.34 0.020 ** 0.968 0.85 0.398   
EDi 38.98 1.92 0.055 *** 15.48 1.90 0.058 *** 
Yj 0.002 9.14 0.000 * 0.001 8.20 0.000 * 
Nj -2.69 -1.15 0.249   -0.041 -0.04 0.971   
EDj 31.27 1.53 0.126   13.80 1.68 0.093 *** 
PTAi -2303.80 -1.78 0.075 *** -1325.88 -2.17 0.030 ** 
PTAij -2139.78 -1.64 0.101   -1084.77 -1.76 0.078 *** 
_cons 684.57 0.24 0.807   1328.42 1.18 0.239   
         
Number of obs 1168    1562    
F( 12,  1155) 25.02  F( 12,1549) 21.89    
Adj R-squared 0.1858    0.1384    
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
For 2010 and 2000 the F-statistic is significant for both models, and the adjusted 
R-Squared is 18.58% for 2010 and 13.84% for 2000, which says that the model predicts 
19% and 14% of the variation in exports respectively. In 2010, this model is significant in 
seven of 12 variables. Four variables are significant at 0.01, one at 0.05 and two at 0.1. 
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Five variables are negative: LOij, Dij, Nj, PTAi, and PTAij. Dij and PTAi are the only 
negative variables that are significant.  
Sharing a common official language (LOij) is negative in this and every model, 
and not significant in this and every model. LOij is negative in every model, even though 
it is expected to be positive. This could be due to multi-collinearity. To assess this, 
analysis was conducted using each of the other dependent variables as the independent 
variable, and was run with and without the LOij variable.  
One mechanism to assess collinearity is to run the regressions in sequence using 
each independent variable as the dependent variable one at a time and evaluate for a low 
resulting R-squared. When this is conducted, the resulting R-squareds ranged from 31%to 
87%, indicating that these results are not of concern. 
When the model is run with all of the core variables plus the preferential trade 
agreement variables, but without common official language, the F-statistic is significant, 
the R-Squared is 18.6%, both PTA variables are significant and negative, and several 
other variables are not significant including population of the exporter, secondary 
education of the exporter, common ethnic language.  If this same analysis is done with 
Tobit instead of OLS, both of the PTA variables are significant, though common ethnic 
language and population of the exporter are again not significant. Running the model 
with the governance variables, the F-Statistic is significant, the R-squared is 18.4% and 
neither governance variable is significant, nor is the common ethnic language variable or 
the population of the exporter.  
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Table 4.4 
Analysis of multicollinearity 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
Aij 87% 
Loij 43% 
Leij 43% 
Dij 60% 
Yi 53% 
Ni 60% 
EDi 31% 
Yj 53% 
Nj 60% 
Edj 31% 
Govi 39% 
GOVj 39% 
PTAi 49% 
PTAij 48% 
 
Analyzing shared border (Aij), distance (Dij), GDP of importer and exporter (Yi 
andYj) and Population of importer and exporter (Ni and Nj), the R squared is 11% and all 
of the variables except distance and population of the importer are positive. All of the 
variables are significant except population of the importer. The R-squared increases to 
18.4% when the secondary education variables are added, and those are both positive and 
significant.   
If Shared Border is combined with Official Language, the F-statistic is significant, 
but the R-squared is only 1%. In addition, official language is negative and not 
significant. When distance is combined with official language, then the F-statistic is not 
significant and both variables are negative and not significant. When the model is run 
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with the two GDP variables and Official Language, the F-Statistic is significant and the 
R-squared is 9%. Official language is positive and not significant. When Official 
Language is run with GDP and Population of the importer and the exporter, LOij is 
positive but not significant. When it is run with ethnic language, both variables are 
significant but Common official language is again negative.  
This same analysis under Tobit regression shows that the Governance indicator of 
the exporter is significant and positive, and the variables that are not significant are the 
common ethnic language, and the governance indicator for the importer.  The results 
when running all of the variables (including governance and preferential trade agreement) 
without the common official language variable have a significant F-statistic and R-
squared of 18.8%. Of the base variables, the ones that were not significant are common 
ethnic language, secondary education of the exporter and the importer, population of the 
importer, governance of the importer and the Y-intercept.  When this same analysis is 
done with Tobit, the chi-squared is significant and the only variable that is not significant 
is the common ethnic language variable and the Y-intercept. The only variables that are 
negative are the preferential trade agreement variables and the Y-Intercept.  As a result of 
this assessment, the Common Official Language variable was retained. Significant 
variables in both time periods include whether the countries share a border (Aij), distance 
between the two countries (Dij), and GDP of both the exporter and the importer (Yi/Yj), 
secondary school enrollment of both the exporter and importer (EDi/EDj), and whether 
the exporter is a member of an SSA trade agreement (PTAi). Population of the exporter 
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(Ni) is only significant in 2010, and whether both trading partners are member of an SSA 
trade agreement (PTAij) is only significant in 2000. 
Aij, Cij, Dij, Yi, Ni, Yj, and Nj are all basic variables in the gravity model and 
expected to drive trade. Aij (common border) is positive, which is expected, as two 
countries that share a border should have more opportunity for trade. Aij increases trade 
by $13B. Dij (Distance between two countries) is negative because the greater the 
distance between two countries, the lower the trade. The fact that Dij is negative aligns 
with the concept that the farther apart two countries are geographically, the less they are 
likely to trade. Increasing Dij (the distance between two countries) decreases trade by 
about $560k for every kilometer of distance between the countries.  
GDP (Yi/Yj) and Population (Ni/Nj) indicate the size of the economy of the 
exporting and importing countries respectively and indicate that countries with larger 
economies drive more trade, both as importer and exporter. Higher income level indicates 
greater potential supply from the exporting country and increased demand of the 
importing country, which would lead to a positive effect on trade. If the population is 
large, it would be expected to increase the ratio of domestic to foreign market production, 
and thus allow greater output diversification. With greater output diversification, there 
would be lower potential demand in the importing country and lower potential supply 
from the exporting country, and an overall decrease in trade. (Sandberg 2006). In both 
models both the exporting and importing countries’ GDPs are significant at 0.01. An 
increase in Yi or Yj (GDP of either the exporter or importer) by $1M increases trade by 
about $1,000 for the exporter in both 2010 and 2000, and by $2,000 for the importer in 
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2010 and by $1,000 for the importer in 2000. An increase in Ni (population of the 
exporter) by 1M will increase trade by $5.5M in 2010, but only by $968,000 in 2000. The 
coefficient on the population of the importer is not significant in either model, but is 
negative in both. 
Table 4.3 indicates that membership of only one partner in an SSA preferential 
trade agreement is significant and has a negative impact on trade in both 2010 and 2000, 
specifically that membership in a PTA decreases trade by $2.3B in 2000 and $1.3B in 
2000. PTAij is negative but not significant in 2010 and significant in 2000, showing that 
in 2000, membership of both trading partners in an SSA PTA results in a $1.1B decrease 
in trade. The guidance from Kanda and Jordaan (2010) indicates that there is neither trade 
creation nor trade expansion when both PTAi and PTAij are negative. In situations like 
the one shown here, with both PTAi and PTAij negative, there is trade contraction. 
Table 4.5 
Impact of SSA Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) on International Trade, 1990 and 
1980, OLS analysis 
  
 
1990 1980 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
Aij 2668.03 6.01 0.000 * 748.93 5.34 0.000 * 
LOij -64.26 -0.18 0.859   -84.64 -0.78 0.437   
Dij -0.158 -4.66 0.000 * -0.073 -6.05 0.000 * 
Yi 0.001 4.63 0.000 * 0.00 4.99 0.000 * 
Ni 0.281 0.50 0.620   0.065 0.29 0.774   
EDi 12.08 2.15 0.032 ** 5.54 3.05 0.002 * 
Yj 0.001 5.08 0.000 * 0.001 7.63 0.000 * 
Nj 0.299 0.52 0.604   0.193 0.8 0.424   
EDj 10.83 2.04 0.042 ** 3.713 2.01 0.045 ** 
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Table 4.5 (continued). 
  
 
1990  1980   
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
PTAi -767.65 -2.43 0.015 ** -349.94 -3.69 0.000 * 
PTAij -736.66 -2.39 0.017 ** -293.63 -3.06 0.002 * 
_cons 1015.46 1.69 0.091 *** 498.44 2.83 0.005 * 
         
Number of obs 1294    1707    
F( 12,  1281) 17.31  F( 12,1694) 23.31    
Adj R-squared 0.1315    0.1356    
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
The analysis in Table 4.5 looks further back in time. The 1980 data primarily 
reflects a time period prior to effect of formal trade organizations. A simple view of the 
effectiveness of PTAs would say that from the time period before the organization 
formally exists to the subsequent time periods later, the expectation would be to see 
higher trade than before the PTA. The first PTA to be implemented, ECOWAS, was 
initiated in 1975.  ECCAS began in 1983, SADC in 1992, COMESA in 1993 and EAC in 
2000.  In both 1990 and 1980 the F-statistic is significant. In 1990, the model explains 
13.2% of the variance in trade, and the 1980 the results are slightly higher at 13.6% of 
trade. The only variables that are not significant in either model are language (official or 
ethnic) and population (both exporter and importer). PTAi and PTAij are again both 
negative, showing that members of preferential trade arrangements do not trade more 
either with other members of their group or with other countries outside of the agreement. 
Both variables in 1990 are significant at the 0.05 level and result in around a $750M 
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decrease in exports. In 1980, both PTAi and PTAij are negative and significant at the 
0.01 level. Exporter membership in a trade group shows a $350M decrease in trade, and 
membership of both parties shows a $300M decrease in trade. In 1980, ECOWAS was 
the only trade group that was in place, and only for five years.  
Looking back over the four decades in Tables 4.3 and 4.5, the PTAi and PTAij 
variables appear to have decreasing significance over time. The trade in countries that 
became members of these agreements was most significant in 1980, at 0.01, when only 
ECOWAS had an agreement in place, and then in 1990, as more organizations were 
established, went to 0.05 significance. In 2000, PTAi was at 0.05 significance and PTAij 
at 0.1 and in 2010, only PTAi is significant at 0.1.  So while there are consistent negative 
trade relationships among the countries in these groups, results demonstrate that the 
ability to tie the results in 2010 back to the influence of the PTAs is at its lowest point in 
the history of the organizations.  
Table 4.6 
Impact of SSA Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) on International Trade, 2010 and 
2000 – TOBIT ANALYSIS 
 
TOBIT 2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
                  
Aij 21926.83 8.49 0.000 * 17132.78 10.89 0.000 * 
LOij -1215.38 -0.64 0.524   322.00 0.29 0.772   
LEij 2411.82 1.23 0.220   2508.41 2.16 0.031 ** 
Dij -1.123 -6.11 0.000 * -0.895 -7.80 0.000 * 
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Table 4.6 (continued). 
 
TOBIT 2010 2000       
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Yi 0.001 5.01 0.000 * 0.001 5.84 0.000 * 
Ni 10.86 3.78 0.000 * 10.453 6.28 0.000 * 
EDi 154.22 5.43 0.000 * 120.01 8.53 0.000 * 
Yj 0.002 8.86 0.000 * 0.002 8.60 0.000 * 
Nj 2.73 0.94 0.350   7.665 4.45 0.000 * 
EDj 107.19 3.76 0.000 * 71.77 4.99 0.000 * 
PTAi -5450.10 -3.13 0.002 * -1644.18 -1.61 0.108   
PTAij -4272.55 -2.39 0.017 ** -2258.10 -2.13 0.033 ** 
_cons -14435.33 -3.72 0.000 * -12624.55 -6.53 0.000 * 
 1168 Number of obs   1562   
 460 left-censored obs at exports <= .1 849   
 708 uncensored observations  712   
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.      
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
The tables above (Table 4.6) and following (Table 4.7) conduct the same analysis 
of PTAi and PTAij as Tables 4.3 and 4.5, this time using Tobit regression instead of 
OLS, in order to address the large number of zero values in the export data. In reviewing 
the Tobit results, there are two noticeable differences. First, these results show an 
increased coefficient size of some of the variables. For example, in the OLS analysis, 
having a common border increased trade by about $13B and in the Tobit analysis of the 
same data set, it shows an impact of increasing trade by almost $22B. Second, the Tobit 
data show differences in level of significance. In the Tobit analysis, PTAij is significant 
in all four of the models. It is significant at 0.05 in 2000 and 2010 and at 0.01 in 1990 and 
1980. In the OLS models, PTAij is significant at 0.01 in 1980 (pre-trade agreements), at 
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0.05 in 1990, at 0.01 in 2000 and not at all in 2010. In the Tobit analysis for the PTAi 
variable, 2010 results are significant at 0.01 and in OLS at 0.1. In 2000, the Tobit data is 
not significant, but the OLS data was significant at 0.05. The Tobit data was significant at 
0.01 in both 1990 and 1980, whereas in the OLS data those two years were significant at 
0.05 and 0.01. As in the OLS models, there is again, some evidence of decreasing 
significance over time. The two variables remain negative in all four of the models.  
GDP, population and education level of the exporter are all significant at 0.01 in 
all models except for 2000 for education level of the exporter. GDP, population and 
education level of the importer is significant and at 0.01 in all models except in 2010 for 
the population of the importer. This model does not support the hypothesis that 
membership in an SSA trade block increases trade for SSA countries, because the results 
are significant and negative on exports.  
Table 4.7 
Impact of SSA Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) on International Trade, 1990 and 
1980. TOBIT ANALYSIS 
 
TOBIT 1990 1980 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
   
                  
Aij 6770.07 9.39 0.000 * 2346.31 9.53 0.000 * 
LOij -192.63 -0.29 0.774   -184.97 -0.84 0.399   
LEij 1117.52 1.59 0.112   719.91 3.19 0.001 * 
Dij -0.302 -4.94 0.000 * -0.192 -7.82 0.000 * 
Yi 0.001 3.81 0.000 * 0.00 5.18 0.000 * 
Ni 3.846 4.39 0.000 * -0.300 -0.62 0.535   
EDi 48.59 4.79 0.000 * 16.77 4.63 0.000 * 
Yj 0.001 4.64 0.000 * 0.001 6.96 0.000 * 
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Table 4.7 (continued). 
 
TOBIT 1990  1980   
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
   
Nj 2.648 2.77 0.006 * 1.755 4.02 0.000 * 
EDj 41.29 4.22 0.000 * 16.905 4.5 0.000 * 
PTAi -2758.72 -4.81 0.000 * -1722.32 -9.04 0.000 * 
PTAij -2181.70 -3.89 0.000 * -773.78 -3.94 0.000 * 
_cons -2945.57 -2.74 0.006 * -581.34 -1.66 0.097 *** 
1294 Number of obs 1707    
777 
left-censored observations at 
exports<=.1 1109    
517 uncensored observations 598    
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Test of H3: Institutional quality affects trade in SSA countries. 
The third hypothesis examines quality of governance in SSA countries. This first 
model utilizes the average of the six good governance indicators both for the exporter and 
for the importer. The institutional quality indicator is an average of the six indicators of 
good governance developed by the World Bank (Kraay, Kaufman and Mastruzzi 2005)  : 
Voice and Accountability (VA)– political, civil and human rights, Political Instability and 
Violence (PS) – likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government, Government 
Effectiveness (GE)–  competence of bureaucracy and quality of public service delivery, 
Regulatory Burden(RB) – incidence of market-unfriendly policies, Rule of Law (RL) – 
quality of contract enforcement, police, and courts, and likelihood of crime and violence, 
and Control of Corruption (CC) – exercise of public power for private gain.  
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In this model of good governance, the data for the governance variables only goes 
back as far as 1996. Therefore, for this analysis by decade, data is only available for 2010 
and 2000. This first analysis in Table 7 utilizes OLS regression, and neither the quality of 
the exporter or the importer is significant in either 2010 or 2000. Utilizing OLS 
regression, this would indicate that this hypothesis is not supported by this data, and that 
quality of government does not have a significant affect on trade. 
Table 4.8 
Impact of government quality on International Trade (average of six Government Quality 
Indicators), 2010 and 2000, OLS Analysis 
OLS 
 
2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
 
 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
                  
Aij 13,325.38 6.65 0.000 * 9,070.97 8.36 0.000 * 
LOij -2,107.90 -1.47 0.141   -876.52 -1.31 0.192   
LEij 1,749.00 1.18 0.236   798.02 1.13 0.257   
Dij -0.52 -4.00 0.000 * -0.25 -3.89 0.000 * 
Yi 0.00 3.95 0.000 * 0.001 4.63 0.000 * 
Ni 7.68 3.02 0.003 * 1.76 1.55 0.122   
EDi 33.27 1.49 0.137 *** 14.57 1.58 0.115  
Yj 0.00 7.87 0.000 * 0.000 7.24 0.000 * 
Nj -0.95 -0.37 0.710   0.000 0.49 0.622   
EDj 30.63 1.37 0.170   13.34 1.42 0.155   
GOVAi 1,566.40 1.70 0.090  *** 684.56 1.64 0.101   
GOVAj 1,196.41 1.30 0.194   511.07 1.21 0.226   
_cons -1,193.11 -0.51 0.608   41.36 0.05 0.963   
Number 
of obs 1168    1562    
F( 12,  
1155) 23.07  F( 12,  1549) 21.57    
Adj R-
squared 0.1850    0.1365    
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Table 4.8 continued. 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.      
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
The F-Statistic is significant for the model, and the adjusted R-Squared is 18.5% 
in 2010 and 13.65% in 2000, indicating that the model predicts 19%and 14% of the 
variation in exports respectively. In 2010, the model is significant in seven of 12 
variables. Five variables are significant at 0.01, and two at 0.1. In 2000, the model is 
significant in four of 12 variables all at 0.01. 
Significant variables in 2010 include whether the countries share a border (Aij), 
distance between the two countries (Dij), GDP of both the exporter (Yi) and the importer 
(Yj), population of the exporter (Ni) and secondary school level of the exporter (EDi).  
The Governance quality indicator of the exporter is significant in 2010 but the importer is 
not, and both are positive. Looking at 2000 results, only shared border, the GDP of 
exporter and importer, and population of the exporter are significant. The Governance 
Matters indicators are positive and not significant. Overall, the null hypothesis can only 
be rejected for the exporter in 2010. For the importer in 2010 and both partners in 2000, 
the null cannot be rejected utilizing this OLS model, and does not show that quality of 
government significantly impacts trade. Table 4.9 will assess the same data using Tobit 
regression. 
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Table 4.9 
Impact of government quality on International Trade (average of six Government Quality 
Indicators), 2010 and 2000.  TOBIT Analysis 
 
TOBIT 2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
                  
Aij 22,341.18 8.67 0.000 * 16,607.32 10.54 0.000 * 
LOij -2,311.67 -1.30 0.234   -469.92 -0.42 0.677   
LEij 2,388.89 1.25 0.226   2,677.53 2.31 0.021 ** 
Dij -1.08 -5.87 0.000 * -0.94 -8.12 0.000 * 
Yi 0.00 3.68 0.000 * 0.001 3.70 0.000 * 
Ni 15.31 4.95 0.000 * 12.35 7.54 0.000 * 
EDi 151.17 4.69 0.000 * 92.95 5.80 0.000 * 
Yj 0.00 7.63 0.000 * 0.000 6.83 0.000 * 
Nj 5.56 1.76 0.084 *** 0.000 5.66 0.000 * 
EDj 115.48 3.65 0.000 * 63.13 3.88 0.000 * 
GOVAi 3,150.03 2.88 0.012 ** 2,695.74 3.79 0.000 * 
GOVAj 1,895.96 1.69 0.130  1,855.14 2.60 0.009 * 
_cons -19,666.02 -5.75 0.000 *** -11,689.38 -7.48 0.000 * 
 1168 
Number of 
obs  1562    
 460 left-censored obs 850    
 708 uncensored obs 712    
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
In both of these Tobit analyses, the chi-squared is significant at 0.01. In 2010, the 
only variables that are not significant are the two common language variables and the 
government quality of the importer. Of the 10 variables that are significant, 7 are at 0.01, 
one at 0.05 and two at 0.1.In 2000, all variables except for Common official language 
(LOij) are significant.   
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Sharing a common border has a $22.4B impact in 2010 and a $17B impact in 
2000. , which is $9B and $7B greater than what was shown using OLS. Distance is 
negative as expected, with more than double the impact on trade as shown in the OLS 
model.  GDP, population and level of secondary education of both the exporter and 
importer are all positive and significant.  Government quality of the exporter is positive at 
0.05 in 2010 and at 0.01 in 2000, and increases trade by $3.1B and $2.7B respectively. 
Government quality of the importer is positive and not significant in 2010 and significant 
in 2000 at 0.1, increasing trade by $2.7B.  
One of the governance indicators under review is significant in 2010, and both are 
significant in 2000, while only the 2010 exporter is significant in the model utilizing 
OLS. Not only are the results showing higher levels of significance using Tobit analysis 
(0.01 vs 0.1), the impact shown for each value is also greater, sometimes by close to 
400%. For example, quality of governance of the importer is significant with Tobit, not 
significant with OLS, and the coefficient is about 60% higher in 2010 using Tobit and 
more than three times greater in 2000 with the Tobit model. Utilizing Tobit analysis, we 
can conclude that the null hypothesis can be rejected for the impact of governance quality 
on the exporter. For the importer, the results are inconsistent and would require further 
analysis, such as conducting the same analysis for additional years to assess patterns. 
 The next analysis examines the individual quality of governance indicators, 
utilizing both OLS and Tobit, to understand how these six different factors are impacting 
trade.  
 
 
91 
 
Table 4.10  
Impact of government quality on International Trade six Government Quality Indicators), 
2010 and 2000.  OLS Analysis 
 
OLS 2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>
t 
 
 
 
         
Aij 12,689.05 6.20 0.000 * 10,127.92 8.28 0.000 * 
LOij -2,188.05 -1.49 0.137   -934.85 -1.27 0.206   
LEij 1,816.12 1.19 0.235   776.68 0.99 0.321   
Dij -0.73 -5.06 0.000 * -0.363 -4.79 0.000 * 
Yi 0.00 3.56 0.000 * 0.001 3.53 0.000 * 
Ni 8.53 2.87 0.004 * 2.19 1.60 0.109   
EDi -3.03 -0.10 0.917   15.96 1.42 0.155   
Yj 0.00 7.28 0.000 * 0.001 6.08 0.000 * 
Nj -0.03 -0.01 0.992   0.105 0.77 0.444   
EDj 3.94 0.14 0.892   14.82 1.29 0.199   
VOCi 1,677.87 1.38 0.169   867.42 1.23 0.218   
POLi 236.19 0.27 0.787   -93.41 -0.17 0.867   
GOVEFi 7,072.27 2.40 0.017 ** 2,428.62 2.17 0.030 ** 
REGi 797.93 0.39 0.694   -1,003.06 -1.26 0.207   
ROLi -7,877.67 -2.92 0.004 * -1,918.72 -1.73 0.085   
CCi 1,500.42 2.18 0.030 ** 851.65 2.27 0.024 ** 
VOCj 1,601.80 1.33 0.185   834.32 0.81 0.416   
POLj 153.64 0.18 0.861   -60.60 0.14 0.886   
GOVEFj 5,196.82 1.76 0.079 ***  1,932.23 1.57 0.117   
REGj 873.27 0.42 0.673   -933.92 0.43 0.670   
ROLj -6,323.84 -2.34 0.020 ** -1,632.90 1.27 0.204   
CCj 1,192.03 1.70 0.089 *** 774.86 2.05 0.041 ** 
_cons 1333.00 0.48 0.632   -43.05 -0.05 0.963   
Number of 
obs 1168  
Number of 
obs 1561    
F( 12,  
1147) 14.34  F( 12,  1548) 21.38    
Adj R-
squared 
0.1861 
  
Adj R-
squared  
0.1355 
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Table 4.10 continued.  
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Looking back at Table 4.8, assessing the average governance variables with OLS 
regression, the only governance variable that is significant is the exporter in 2010 at 0.1. 
In this analysis the six governance indicators are assessed individually using OLS, as 
shown here in table 4.10. In 2010, six of the 12 governance quality indicators are 
significant, the same three variables of Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption, for both the importer and the exporter. Rule of Law of the 
exporter is significant at 0.01, and 0.05 for the importer. Rule of law shows as having a 
negative impact on trade for both exporter and importer. This could be one of the 
situations where similar countries that lack rule of law are trading together and therefore 
lack of rule of law drives trade. Government Effectiveness of the exporter in 2010 is 
significant at 0.05 and for the importer is significant at 0.1. In both scenarios it is 
positive. Control of corruption is significant for the exporter at 0.05 and at 0.1 for the 
importer. Both of these variables are positive.  
In 2000, Government Effectiveness of the exporter is significant at 0.05, control 
of corruption of the exporter and the importer are both significant at 0.05 and all are 
positive.  
 The average governance quality of the exporter is significant in 2010 and yet 
three of the individual indicators for both the exporter and the importer are significant in 
this individual analysis. The reason that the average governance quality of the importer 
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(GOVAi in prior analysis) was not significant in 2010 may be a combination of the 
positive and negative impacts of the individual variables, as well as the fact that the level 
of significance on the importer variables is less strong than the level of significance on 
the exporter variables. 
Table 4.11 
Impact of government quality on International Trade six Government Quality Indicators), 
2010 and 2000.  TOBIT Analysis 
 
TOBIT 2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Aij 22,314.34 8.54 0.000 * 19,595.73 10.97 0.000 * 
LOij -1,562.61 -0.79 0.430   -1,360.08 -1.08 0.282   
LEij 446.01 0.22 0.826   2,003.64 1.53 0.127   
Dij -1.24 -6.3 0.000 * -1.11 -8.16 0.000 * 
Yi 0.00 2.69 0.007 * 0.000 1.88 0.060 ** 
Ni 14.84 3.9 0.000 * 12.61 6.10 0.000 * 
EDi 81.33 1.98 0.047 ** 71.06 3.67 0.000 * 
Yj 0.00 6.18 0.000 * 0.001 5.25 0.000 * 
Nj 6.16 1.62 0.105  1.16 5.42 0.000 * 
EDj 45.74 1.12 0.262   54.51 2.74 0.006 * 
VOCi 69.56 0.04 0.967   1,004.03 0.80 0.422   
POLi -2,919.07 -2.26 0.024 ** -3,122.15 -2.98 0.003 * 
GOVEFi 5,714.29 1.38 0.168  10,359.93 5.29 0.000 * 
REGi 9,197.01 3.1 0.002 * -684.52 -0.47 0.636   
ROLi -5,092.66 -1.38 0.169  -3,822.48 -1.94 0.053 ***  
CCi -966.27 -1.02 0.310  363.96 0.58 0.564  
VOCj 998.45 0.6 0.552   2,769.11 2.22 0.027   
POLj -3,442.09 -2.78 0.005 * -2,465.68 -2.49 0.013 ** 
GOVEFj 6,640.25 1.62 0.106  5,627.30 2.84 0.005 * 
REGj 4,024.50 1.36 0.174   -341.56 -0.24 0.814   
ROLj -3,015.42 -0.82 0.415   -3,049.61 -1.57 0.118   
CCj -699.24 -0.72 0.474  536.88 0.84 0.400  
_cons -11,375.61 -2.57 0.010 ** -10,795.58 -5.85 0.000 * 
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Table 4.11 (continued). 
 
TOBIT 
Variable 
 
2010 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1168 Number of obs    1403 
460 
Left-censored 
observations    772 
708 
Uncensored 
observations    631 
0 
Right-censored 
observations     0  
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Looking back at, Table 4.9, which assesses the average governance variables with 
OLS regression, the average governance quality of the exporter is significant in 2010 and 
the average governance quality of both the exporter and the importer are significant in 
2000. In this Tobit analysis in Table 4.11 with the six indicators broken out, there are 
quite a few differences from the OLS analysis. Political instability of the exporter and 
importer is significant in both 2010 (.05) and 2000 (0.1), and was not significant at all 
with OLS, and Regulatory Burden of the exporter is also significant in 2010, but was not 
significant with OLS.  
In the OLS analysis, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption of both exporter and importer are all significant in 2010 and in 2000, only 
Government effectiveness of the exporter is significant, none of the other five variables 
are significant.  In this Tobit analysis in 2010, Government Effectiveness is not 
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significant at all, neither for the exporter nor the importer, though it is significant for both 
in 2000, and it is positive in all instances.   
What is unusual about this Tobit analysis is that in every other comparison 
between OLS and Tobit, the Tobit results have all the variables significant that are 
significant with OLS, plus additional variables, and at a higher degree of significance. In 
this analysis, the Tobit results have a couple of significant variables that were not 
significant with OLS, but does not show all the variables as significant that were 
significant with OLS. This is unusual compared to all of the other findings in this study, 
and it would be helpful to run this same analysis for the other years for which the data is 
available to see how these results compare.  
The analysis that follows examines combined variables that impact all three of the 
hypotheses for this dissertation. The governance variables are only available in 2000 and 
2010, so these results only cover those two time periods.  
Table 4.12 
Impact of preferential trade agreements (PTA) and government quality on International 
Trade (average of six Government Quality Indicators), 2010 and 2000. OLS Analysis 
 
OLS 2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
Coef. 
 
T 
 
P>t 
 
 
  
Aij 13,069.74 6.53 0.000 * 8,871.32 8.17 0.000 * 
LOij -g,058.10 -1.44 0.150   -800.97 -1.19 0.233   
LEij 1,867.77 1.27 0.205   947.52 1.34 0.179   
Dij -0.63 -4.60 0.000 * -0.304 -4.53 0.000 * 
Yi 0.00 3.53 0.000 * 0.001 4.33 0.000 * 
Ni 7.47 2.94 0.003 * 1.31 1.13 0.259   
EDi 7.64 0.29 0.768   5.73 0.57 0.570   
 
 
96 
 
Table 4.12 (continued). 
 
OLS 
Variable 
 
 
2010 2000 
  
 
Coef. 
 
T 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
T 
 
P>t 
 
 
  
Yj 0.00 7.43 0.000 * 0.001 6.96 0.000 * 
Nj -1.11 -0.44 0.663   0.023 0.20 0.844   
EDj 7.30 0.28 0.779   6.59 0.65 0.517   
GOVAi 1,841.16 1.98 0.048 ** 710.05 1.70 0.089   
GOVAj 1,453.40 1.57 0.117   527.39 1.25 0.210   
PTAi -2,674.95 -2.05 0.040 ** -1,350.17 -2.21 0.027 ** 
PTAij -2,454.04 -1.87 0.062 *** -1,108.78 -1.80 0.072 *** 
_cons 5,937.92 1.68 0.093 *** 2,782.14 2.09 0.037 *** 
Number of obs 1168    1562    
F( 14,  1153) 20.38  F( 14,  1147) 19.1    
Adj R-squared 0.1887    0.1397    
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
The F-Statistic is significant for the model, and the adjusted R-Squared is 18.87% 
in 2010 and 13.97% in 2000, indicating that the model predicts 19% and 14% of the 
variation in exports respectively. In 2010, the model is significant in nine of 14 variables. 
Five variables are significant at 0.01, two at 0.05, and two at 0.1. In 2000, the model is 
significant in seven of 14 variables. Four variables are significant at 0.01 and one at 0.05 
and two at 0.1. 
Significant variables in 2010 include whether the countries share a border (Aij), 
distance between the two countries (Dij), GDP of both the exporter (Yi) and the importer 
(Yj), population of the exporter (Ni), quality of governance of the exporter (GOVAi), 
SSA PTA membership of the exporter (PTAi) and PTA membership of both the exporter 
and importer (PTAij).  Three of the four indicators being tested in this model are 
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significant, and only the governance quality of the importer (GOVAj) is not significant.  
The PTA variables continue to be negative.  
The results of this analysis show that with both PTAi and PTAij negative and 
significant, then there is confirmed trade contraction (Kanda and Jordaan 2010). This 
model shows that membership in an SSA PTA decreases trade by $2.7B when the 
exporter is a member of an SSA PTA and by $2.6B when both trading partners are 
members of a PTA. In addition, this shows that the impact of government quality of the 
exporter (GOVAi) is significant, as it also is when tested without the PTA variables 
(Table 4.7). The results again disprove hypotheses one and two and validate hypothesis 
three on the part of the exporter. 
Looking at 2000 results, the major differences with the 2010 data are that the 
variables for the population of the importer (Ni) and the governance quality of the 
exporter (GOVAi) are not significant. The PTAi and PTAij variables are significant and 
negative, thus are unable to reject the null hypothesis. When the exporter is a member of 
an SSA PTA, trade is reduced by $1.4B and by $1.1B when both partners are members of 
an SSA PTA. 
Kuncic (2013) conducts analysis similar to that in this study, utilizing regional 
trade agreements and institutional quality. He also includes membership in world trade 
organization and indicators for institutional distance that he developed himself (Kuncic 
2012). The focus of his study is on Asian-Caribbean Pacific trade with the European 
Union (EU). He determines that the institutions of both the exporter and the importer are 
important, and says that good economic and political institutions on the exporter side 
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seem to encourage trade. This is similar to what is seen in this analysis – results of the 
governance indicators for the exporter are stronger than those for the importer. De Groot 
et al. (2004) also indicate that institutional similarities increase trade.  
Table 4.13 
Impact of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and 
government quality on International Trade (average of six Government Quality 
Indicators), 2010 and 2000.  TOBIT Analysis 
 
TOBIT 2010 2000 
Variable 
 
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
  
Coef. 
 
t 
 
P>t 
   
                  
Aij 21,952.35 8.53 0.000 * 16,423.85 10.44 0.000 * 
LOij -2,372.07 -1.23 0.221   -462.85 -0.41 0.681   
LEij 2,870.32 1.46 0.145   3,037.35 2.60 0.009 * 
Dij -1.24 -6.64 0.000 * -0.982 -8.42 0.000 * 
Yi 0.00 3.03 0.002 * 0.001 3.49 0.000 * 
Ni 14.71 4.65 0.000 * 11.86 6.98 0.000 * 
EDi 90.84 2.54 0.011 ** 83.11 4.80 0.000 * 
Yj 0.00 7.00 0.000 * 0.001 6.54 0.000 * 
Nj 5.14 1.60 0.109  0.876 4.99 0.000 * 
EDj 69.32 1.93 0.054 *** 47.95 2.70 0.007 ** 
GOVAi 3,636.66 2.90 0.004 * 2,670.08 3.76 0.000 * 
GOVAj 2,277.54 1.82 0.069 *** 1,801.67 2.53 0.011 ** 
PTAi -6,036.77 -3.46 0.001 * -1,401.37 -1.37 0.172  
PTAij -4,600.16 -2.57 0.010 * -2,130.42 -2.01 0.045 ** 
_cons -5,046.91 -1.05 0.294   -7,884.64 -3.55 0.000 * 
 1168 
Number of 
obs  1562    
 460 
left-censored 
observations 850    
 708 
uncensored 
observations 712    
 
 
 
99 
 
Table 4.13 continued. 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
 ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 *** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
In this Tobit analysis, the chi-squared is significant at 0.01, and significance of the 
results obtained in the two time periods differs. In 2010, common official common ethnic 
language, population of the importer and the intercept are not significant. Eleven of the 
15 variables are significant, eight of those at the 0.01 level.  These variables include 
sharing a common border (Aij), distance (Dij), GDP of the importer (Yi) and the exporter 
(Yj), population of the exporter (Ni), governance quality of the exporter (GOVAi), and 
SSA PTA membership of the exporter (PTAi) or of both trading partners (PTAij). One 
variable, secondary education of the exporter, is significant at the 0.05 level. . Two final 
variables are significant at the 0.1 level, the secondary education level of the importing 
country (EDj) and governance quality of the importer (GOVAj). The signs on the 
significant variables are all positive except for Distance, which is expected to be 
negative, and the PTA variables, PTAi and PTAij, which again shows that the hypothesis 
that preferential trade agreements in SSA countries improve trade is not valid. This model 
shows that the hypothesis that good governance improves trade is valid for both the 
exporter and the importer. 
Sharing a common border is significant and positive with a $22.0B impact, which 
is $9B greater than what was shown using OLS. Distance is significant and negative as 
expected, with about double the impact shown in the OLS model.  Government quality of 
the exporter is positive, increases trade by $3.6B and is roughly double the impact 
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identified in the OLS model. The government quality of the importer is positive and 
increases trade by $2.3B. PTAi decreases trade by $6.0B, twice the result from the OLS 
model, and PTAij decreases trade by $4.6B, about two million more than the results from 
the OLS model.  
In 2000, every variable except common official language and membership in an 
SSA PTA by the exporter is significant, including the intercept. There are nine variables 
significant at the 0.01 level and three at 0.05. Sharing a border (Aij) increases trade by 
$16.4B, which is almost double the results from the OLS model. Sharing a common 
ethnic language impacts trade by 3B, which is more than triple the OLS results.  Other 
notable differences from the OLS model are distance (Dij) which is more than triple the 
OLS output, population of the exporter (Ni) which is about eight times more than the 
OLS model, secondary education level of the exporter (Edi) which is about 15 times 
more than the OLS model, population of the importer (Nj) is more than 30 times bigger 
than the OLS output. For the variables being assessed, the two government quality 
indicators are more than three times greater than with OLS, and PTAi is slightly higher, 
while PTAij is about double. Overall, this model shows that the governance quality 
hypothesis is valid, that good governance of both the exporter and the importer improve 
trade. As seen throughout this document, PTA membership serves only to reduce trade. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
This paper assesses the impact of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and 
government quality on international trade. The results of this analysis demonstrate that 
SSA RTAs have a negative impact on trade while government quality has a positive 
impact. There are three hypotheses in this paper which assess trade by exporting 
countries who are part of an SSA trade agreement, trade among countries when both 
trading partners are members of an SSA trade agreement, and trade impacts of 
government quality. 
This paper analyzes SSA trade agreements: South African Development 
Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS).  
Theories examined in this paper are based on economic geography and the effect 
of institutions on development. Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008) state that economic 
geography addresses location, such as where producers are located in relation to 
consumers, and benefits and costs of location-related choices.  Puga and Venables (1999) 
suggest that poor countries transition to a developed state one at a time, at a rapid pace. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) and North (1990) identify that economic 
institutions, which align resources with most efficient resources, are the determining 
factor for a country’s ability to develop and grow.  Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
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say that economic institutions define both an economy’s potential for economic growth 
and distribution of wealth resulting from economic growth.  
De Melo and Tsikata (2014) state that PTAs and regional integration are the right 
direction, but the integration approach taken to date has not proven successful. They 
describe the integration model as linear, beginning with goods, labor and capital markets, 
through fiscal integration in a monetary union. De Melo and Tsikata also note the lack of 
trade infrastructure and full integration that makes the borders between partner countries 
more permeable, allowing a greater flow of labor and development of infrastructure 
where they are needed. Lack of compensation mechanisms and inconsistent distribution 
of gains has obstructed progress, as has a focus on trade in goods rather than trade in 
services, which is growing worldwide at a higher level. De Melo and Tsikata (2014) point 
out that the PTAs in Africa are made up of countries with extremely varied access to 
resources, and this is more than in other parts of the world. Permeable borders also 
increase the likelihood of UTT, which results in a lower need for formal trade agreements 
and moves the countries away from the undesirable Nash equilibrium with out any 
negotiation required. 
A 2012 technical paper on potential growth in SSA countries (International Trade 
Centre 2012) identifies lack of value-added goods as a key issue for SSA countries and 
makes three recommendations to improve SSA growth. The International Trade Centre 
(2012) proposes improving SSA infrastructure to reduce transportation costs by half (at 
the cost of $13B per year for 10 years, assumed not to be funded by SSA countries), 
improving customs procedures to reduce processing time by half within two years, and 
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reducing SSA-Asian trade costs. As a result of these changes, the International Trade 
Centre proposes that SSA exports would increase by as much as 50%, with improvement 
in terms of trade, increases in imports and transformed products. They forecast an 
increase in real income between one percent and 1.7% and a GDP gain of $15B by 2025. 
In a case study of Bharti Airtel, an Indian cellular company which expanded 
operations to SSA in 2010, Palepu and Biljani  (2012) note the high costs of 
transportation in SSA countries.  With operations in 16 countries, Bharti Airtel could not 
reach landlocked countries via ship and would have to make deliveries via helicopter, 
elephant, or even build a road for access. The time required for transportation only served 
to increase the costs, taking 15 days up to two months from port to final destination. They 
also describe that air transportation from one country to another could take as much as 30 
hours, frequently with routing through Europe.  
H1: Membership in an active SSA trade bloc increases trade in SSA countries: 
SSA countries that are members of SADC, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS or ECOWAS 
experience higher trade than countries that are not members of one of those five trade 
blocs. Hypotheses one utilizes a preferential trade agreement (PTA) variable. PTAi 
represents when the exporting country is a member of an SSA trade group.  
Results of analysis show that this these variable is significant, but has a negative 
impact on trade. When only one trading partner is a member of a PTA, then trade 
declines. This variable is significant and negative in all four time periods (1980, 1990, 
2000 and 2010). In the earliest time period of 1980, before there are formal trade 
agreements in place for sufficient time to have impact, the significance is strongest (yet 
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still negative) at 0.01. In 1990 it is significant at 0.05 and in both 2000 and 2010, it is 
significant at 0.1. Thus significance decreases over time. With Tobit analysis, both 1980 
and 1990 are at 0.01 significance. 2000 is not significant, and 2010 is again significant at 
0.01. The next hypothesis assesses whether there are benefits within the trading groups. 
H2: Membership in an SSA trade bloc increases trade between members of the 
trade bloc: Trade is higher when both countries are members of an SSA trade bloc 
(member-to-member trade). The second hypothesis also uses a trading bloc variable, 
PTAij, which reflects when both the exporting and importing countries are members of 
an SSA preferential trade agreement. This variable is significant in three of the four time 
periods using OLS, and is negative in all time periods.  
In 1980, the earliest time period, before there are formal trade agreements in 
place, the significance is strongest at 0.01. In 1990 it is significant at 0.05 and in 2000 it 
is significant at 0.1, and in 2010 it is not significant at all. With Tobit, PTAij is 
significant in 1980 and 1990 at 0.01 and in both 2000 and 2010 at 0.05. Again, the level 
of significance and the size of the coefficients is greater using Tobit. Thus significance 
decreases over time, which indicates that influence of regionalism in general is 
decreasing, and given that the variable is always negative, these trading blocs have not 
been able to successfully create trade with their partner countries.  
Across these two hypotheses, both PTAi and PTAij are negative in all four 
models. If the dependent variable analysis is positive, it reflects trade creation because it 
shows there is more trade among the countries who are both members of the trading 
group.  If the coefficient is positive, it is evidence of more trade than expected between a 
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member of the trading bloc and a non-member. If the coefficient is negative, it indicates 
trade diversion because there is less trade with non-PTA countries than is expected 
(Kanda and Jordaan 2010). In this study, with both PTAi and PTAij negative, trade is 
neither being created nor diverted, trade is contracting according to Kanda (2010). 
H3: Institutional quality of SSA countries affects trade.  This third hypothesis 
assess the impact of good governance on international trade. The analysis in Table 47 
utilizes OLS regression. The quality of the exporter but not the importer is significant in 
2010, and neither the quality of the exporter or the importer is significant in 2000. If the 
OLS analysis were sufficient to asses this information, then results indicate that this 
hypothesis is not supported by this data, and that quality of government does not have a 
significant affect on trade.  
With Tobit regression in 2010, the governance indicator of the exporter is 
significant at the 0.05 level and of the importer is not significant. In 2000, Government 
quality of both the exporter and the importer is positive at 0.01.In 2010, government 
quality of the exporter is positive and increases trade by $3.1B and government quality of 
the importer is positive and increases trade by $1.9B. In 2000, government quality of the 
exporter is positive and increases trade by $2.7B and the government quality of the 
importer is positive and increases trade by $1.9B. This model demonstrates the benefit of 
utilizing Tobit analysis to address the large number of zero values found in international 
trade data. With the Tobit regression, zero values are replaced with a small number, 0.1 
in this instance, to address the fact that in most instances the zeroes reflect unreported 
rather than nonexistent trade. 
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With Tobit, both of the governance indicators under review are significant in 
2000, where neither is significant in the model utilizing OLS. Results show not just 
significance, but high significance, with Tobit analysis. Each coefficient is also greater, 
sometimes by almost 400%. Utilizing Tobit analysis, we can conclude that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected and we can see the significant impact of good governance on 
trade. 
The combined model with both the trade agreement variables and the good 
governance variables shows that both of the PTA variables are significant in 2010 and 
2000 with OLS, more significant than when the model is run without the governance 
variables. For PTAi, in the model without governance, it is significant at 0.1 and 0.05 and 
in the model that includes governance it is significant at 0.05 in both 2010 and 2000. For 
PTAij, in the model without governance it is not significant in 2010 and significant at 0.1 
in 2000, and with the governance variable it is significant at 0.01 in 2010 and not 
significant at all in 2000 
Utilizing Tobit regression to analyze both the PTA variables and the governance 
variables, significance and size of the coefficients again increases. In 2010, governance 
quality of the exporter (GOVAi), and SSA PTA membership of the exporter (PTAi) or of 
both trading partners (PTAij) are all significant, but PTAi is not significant in 2000. 
Governance quality of the importer (GOVAj) is significant at 0.1 in 2010 and 0.05 in 
2000. For the governance variables, where the only significant variable was the exporter 
in 2010 at 0.1, with Tobit both governance variables are significant in both years. 
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Contributions of this Research 
 This research contributes to understanding related to both trade blocs and good 
governance, and to use of Tobit regression with the gravity model. In relation to trade 
blocs, this research demonstrates that SSA trading agreements are not positively 
impacting trade. On the other hand, the government quality variables show that trade is 
impacted by the quality of government. The analysis shows that Tobit regression 
provides stronger results with the gravity model than OLS.  
Limitations of this Research 
 There are a number of limitations to this research, beginning with the trade data 
itself. As has been noted within this document, there is a great deal of unreported trade 
and the trade data itself frequently has zero values even where some trade exists. There 
are also limitations to the governance variables, since they are not available before 1996..  
As noted by Kaufmann, there are limitations to the governance data itself indicating that 
the data should not be utilized at a detailed level to compare one country to another, but 
only to compare relative positions.  
Implications for Future Research 
 Future research should include analyzing the impacts of individual PTAs over 
time and further assessing other studies of these SSA PTAs and their impacts on the 
region. Several of the groups have peacekeeping functions, so that may have more 
influence than the trade impacts, but if they are not driving growth, then there is still need 
for more understanding of development and growth in SSA. Deeper analysis of what 
makes a PTA successful might be of use, otherwise if interventions are implemented like 
 
 
108 
 
those suggested by the International Trade Centre (2012) they should be carefully 
monitored for impact.  
Further analysis could be conducted on the negative results of the common 
official language variable. With good governance, there is opportunity to conduct further 
analysis on the six individual variables and understand their impact on countries like the 
SSA countries to further identify impacts on growth. With regard to the governance 
variables, more analysis of data across all available years would be helpful in better 
understanding the implications of the findings in this paper. 
Another area of research, to further understand impacts on growth at a more 
granular level, would be to augment variables data related to size of tariff reductions, 
exchange rate management and access to imported inputs. Babatunde (2009) notes that 
there a contradictory findings on whether trade liberalization has improved export 
performance and examines SSA countries after the trade liberalization efforts that were 
introduced subsequent to the IMF programs of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1980s and 1990s. Babatunde utilizes 
panel least squares estimation technique and analyzes the SSA countries by region (West, 
East, South and Central). What Babatunde determines is that trade liberalization is not 
sufficient to increase exports. He finds no significant effect of reductions in trade 
protections on exports, but that there is significance with access to imported inputs and 
effective valuation of exchange rates. Utilizing these variables with the gravity model and 
Tobit analysis would provide additional understanding of SSA growth.  
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